Aelodau’r Pwyllgor Materion Cyfansoddiadol a
Deddfwriaethol yn bresennol Members of the
Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee in
attendance
|
Alun Davies
|
Llafur Labour
|
Suzy Davies
|
Ceidwadwyr Cymreig
Welsh Conservatives
|
Dafydd Elis-Thomas
|
Plaid Cymru The Party of
Wales
|
David Melding
|
Y Dirprwy Lywydd a Chadeirydd y Pwyllgor
The
Deputy Presiding Officer and Committee Chair
|
William Powell
|
Democratiaid Rhyddfrydol Cymru
Welsh Liberal
Democrats
|
Aelodau’r Pwyllgor Materion Cymreig yn
bresennol
Members of the Welsh Affairs Committee in
attendance
|
Byron Davies
|
Y Blaid
Geidwadol
The Conservative Party
|
Chris Davies
|
Y Blaid
Geidwadol
The Conservative Party
|
David T.C. Davies
|
Y Blaid Geidwadol (Cadeirydd y Pwyllgor)
The Conservative
Party (Committee Chair)
|
Carolyn Harris
|
Llafur Labour
|
Gerald Jones
|
Llafur
Labour
|
Christina Rees
|
Llafur
Labour
|
Antoinette Sandbach
|
Y Blaid
Geidwadol
The Conservative Party
|
Liz Saville Roberts
|
Plaid Cymru
The Party of Wales
|
Craig Williams
|
Y Blaid
Geidwadol
The Conservative Party
|
Mark Williams
|
Y Democratiaid Rhyddfrydol
Liberal Democrats
|
Eraill yn bresennol Others in
attendance
|
Emyr Lewis
|
Partner ac
Uwch-bartner Rhanbarthol, Blake Morgan
Partner and Regional Senior Partner, Blake Morgan
|
Yr
Athro/Professor Richard Wyn Jones
|
Canolfan
Llywodraethiant Cymru
Wales Governance Centre
|
Yr Athro/Professor Roger Scully
|
Canolfan
Llywodraethiant Cymru
Wales Governance Centre
|
Yr
Athro/Professor Thomas Glyn Watkin
|
|
Swyddogion Cynulliad Cenedlaethol Cymru a Thŷ’r
Cyffredin yn bresennol National Assembly
for Wales and House of Commons officials in
attendance
|
Stephen Boyce
|
Y Gwasanaeth Ymchwil
Research Service
|
Gwyn Griffiths
|
Uwch-gynghorydd Cyfreithiol
Senior Legal Adviser
|
Ruth Hatton
|
Dirprwy Glerc
Deputy Clerk
|
Gareth Howells
|
Cynghorydd Cyfreithiol
Legal Adviser
|
Elin
Jones
|
Cynghorydd, y
Pwyllgor Materion Cymreig
Adviser, Welsh Affairs Committee
|
Naomi Stocks
|
Clerc
Clerk
|
Dr Alys Thomas
|
Y Gwasanaeth
Ymchwil
Research Service
|
Richard
Ward
|
Clerc, y Pwyllgor
Materion Cymreig
Clerk, Welsh Affairs Committee
|
Gareth Williams
|
Ail Glerc
Second Clerk
|
Dechreuodd y
cyfarfod am 13:31.
The meeting began at 13:31.
|
Cyflwyniad,
Ymddiheuriadau, Dirprwyon a Datgan Buddiannau
Introduction, Apologies, Substitutions and Declarations of
Interest
|
[1]
David
Melding: Good afternoon,
everyone, and welcome to this joint meeting of the Constitutional
and Legislative Affairs Committee and the Welsh Affairs Committee
from Westminster. Can I just start with some of the formalities?
I’ve received apologies from James Davies MP. It is with
great pleasure that I welcome everyone to this joint session. I
think it’s the first time that an Assembly and a Westminster
committee have met together since 2012, and I believe it’s
the first time that the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs
Committee and the Welsh select committee have had a joint meeting.
So, we could be in the territory of precedent here, David, I hope.
I’m delighted to welcome David Davies as Chair of the select
committee and all our colleagues from Westminster. I will welcome
the witnesses shortly.
|
[2]
Can I
just say that we do not expect a routine fire alarm, so if we hear
the bell, please follow the instructions of the ushers, who will
help us leave the building safely? Can you please switch all mobile
devices to at least silent?
|
[3]
These
proceedings will be conducted in Welsh and English. When Welsh is
spoken, there’s a translation on channel 1. Should any of you
be hard of hearing, you can amplify our proceedings on channel 0.
Can I remind our colleagues from Westminster that you do not need
to touch any of the microphones; they will operate automatically?
Before I start the short formal proceedings of the Constitutional
and Legislative Affairs Committee, before we go into our joint
session, I’ll just ask David to say a few words.
|
[4]
David T.C.
Davies: Just to say, Mr
Chairman, it’s a great pleasure to be back here at a joint
meeting and also, if I may say, to be co-chairing a committee back
in the Assembly with some very distinguished Assembly Members here,
who may remember me coming here as a 28-year-old. Time moves on.
Thank you very much indeed for your hospitality and, indeed, I hope
this is a precedent and perhaps we’ll be able to welcome you
to a joint committee meeting in Westminster. I think it’s
wonderful that, despite the political differences that sometimes
exist between some of us, we can all work together for the good of
Wales. Thank you very much.
|
[5]
David
Melding: Thank you very
much, David. We would very much welcome such an invitation, and
it’s a great pleasure to see you back here this afternoon,
and other former colleagues, indeed, amongst the Members of
Parliament here this afternoon. Of course, a particularly warm
welcome to all other MPs who are here for the first time, anyway,
in any formal sense. So, you’re very, very welcome. The next
couple of items will be just to get through some routine business
that the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee has to
deal with.
|
13:34
|
Offerynnau Nad
Ydynt yn Cynnwys Materion i Gyflwyno Adroddiad Arnynt o dan Reol
Sefydlog 21.2 neu 21.3
Instruments that Raise No Reporting Issues under Standing Order
21.2 or 21.3
|
[6]
David
Melding: So, we move to
item 2, which is instruments that raise no reporting issues under
our Standing Orders, but they are listed there for Members. Are
there any issues? Are we content? We are content.
|
Papurau i’w
Nodi
Papers to Note
|
[7]
David
Melding: Item 3 is papers
to note. There is a letter from Leighton Andrews. Shall we note
that? Thank you very much. So, that ends the formal proceedings of
the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee. Now we move
into our joint session.
|
Tystiolaeth mewn
perthynas â’r Bil Cymru Drafft
Evidence in relation to the Draft Wales Bill
|
[8]
David
Melding: It’s a great
pleasure for me to welcome our first set of witnesses, Professor
Thomas Glyn Watkin, and Emyr Lewis from Blake Morgan. Gentleman,
you are most welcome this afternoon. I think you’ve just
heard me welcome our visitors from Westminster. We’re
delighted this really important constitutional development is going
to get fully scrutinised—in this session, anyway—by
both committees. So, I’m delighted you are here. You’re
both very used to the way we work, so I suspect you’re going
to be very comfortable with us moving directly to questions. I
suspect both of you will want to say something in response to most
of the questions, but, obviously, on some issues you may not want
to repeat points that you agree with, and there may be some areas
where you feel your colleague has a more in-depth view and that you
don’t need to particularly cover those points, because we do,
actually, want to cover quite a lot of material.
|
[9]
I’m just
going to start with a general question to set the context.
Obviously, we will then move into the detail, so you don’t
need to be too comprehensive and lengthy in replying to this. When
we looked at the command paper, the Constitutional and Legislative
Affairs Committee said that the principle of subsidiarity and the
desire for clarity, simplicity and workability ought to be at the
heart of the draft Bill. I think that might be a good place to
start and whether you feel the draft either achieves that or gets
very close to achieving it. Perhaps, Thomas, you would like to
respond first.
|
[10]
Professor
Watkin: Thank you, Mr
Chairman. I regret to say that I don’t think that the manner
in which the reserved matters have been arrived at does reflect
what was asked for by the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs
Committee, and that is that it should be approached on the basis of
principle, the principle being subsidiarity. Looking at the
list—and I’ve not analysed it in any great
depth—it seems to betray, once more, a harking back to the
days of executive devolution, and the hand of the history of
executive devolution seems to lie very heavy upon it. I think that
is unfortunate. The reason that I think it is unfortunate is this:
the question of executive devolution is largely concerned with,
when it is necessary, appropriate or convenient, implementing a
policy in a different way in a different country. That strikes me
as being a very different question from whether or not a policy
itself should be determined differently in that country.
|
[11]
The
question about legislative devolution, to me, is about
self-determination, and that does not raise the same issues as
whether or not a common policy can be implemented differently in a
different place. I very much regret, therefore, that that step has
not been taken, because I think, actually, a satisfactory
constitutional solution not just for Wales, but for the United
Kingdom, requires, and requires urgently, an approach of that
nature.
|
[12]
David
Melding: Emyr, do you
concur with that?
|
[13]
Mr
Lewis: Rwy’n cytuno gyda’r sylwadau ynglŷn â
sybsidiaredd. Fe wnaethoch chi ofyn hefyd ynglŷn ag eglurdeb a
symlrwydd. Mae arnaf i ofn fod yna ddarpariaethau yn y Bil drafft
yma nad ydyn nhw ddim yn eglur, sydd ddim yn rhai fydd yn arwain,
rwy’n ofni, at eglurdeb a symlrwydd o ran bod y ddeddfwrfa
fan hyn yn deall yn hollol beth yw rhychwant ei gallu i ddeddfu.
Felly, yr ateb yw ‘na,’ ond, wedi dweud hynny, gydag
ewyllys da, rwy’n siŵr, byddai modd trwsio’r
problemau, a gydag ychydig o ddychymyg, byddai modd trwsio’r
diffygion yma.
|
Mr
Lewis: I do agree with
the comments on subsidiarity. You also asked about clarity and
simplicity. I’m afraid that there are provisions in this
draft Wales Bill that are certainly not clear and are not
provisions that, I fear, will lead to clarity or simplicity in
terms of the legislature here understanding exactly what the range
of its legislative powers are. The answer to your question is
‘no’, but, having said that, with goodwill, I’m
sure, we could fix the problems that have emerged, and, with some
imagination, we could correct these deficiencies.
|
[14]
David
Melding: Thank you for
those answers by way of introduction, and we’ll now follow up
and go into some of these matters in detail. I’ll ask David
to put the first question.
|
[15]
David T.C.
Davies: Could I ask either
of the witnesses if either of you see any significance in the
apparent omission in clause 3, of the Assembly being able to make
any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament? This was
in the Government of Wales Act 2006. It doesn’t appear to be
there, but perhaps you could say whether you see any significance
to that or whether it’s by now very clear that the Assembly
can make any Act that it wants to within the devolved powers, and
that it therefore doesn’t need to be restated.
|
[16]
Mr
Lewis: Rwy’n credu eich bod chi’n iawn yn eich
dehongliad. Rydych chi’n iawn yn eich dehongliad. Nid oes
darpariaeth felly yn Neddf yr Alban 1998. Roedd y Cynulliad yn
gallu gwneud Mesurau, fel rydych chi’n gwybod, ac yna
newidiodd hynny, yn sgil refferendwm 2011, i wneud Deddfau neu
Actau. Yr oedd y geiriau hyn mewn lle ar gyfer Mesurau o dan yr hen
drefn, rwy’n amau er mwyn osgoi unrhyw amheuaeth.
|
Mr
Lewis: I think that
you’re right in your interpretation. You are right in your
interpretation. There is no such provision in the Scotland Act
1998. The Assembly was able to make Measures, as you know, and then
that changed, as a result of the 2011 referendum, to the Assembly
making Acts. These words were in place for Measures under the old
regime, I believe in order to avoid any doubt.
|
[17]
David T.C. Davies: A
oes raid inni gael y geiriau sydd yn y 2006 Act?
|
David T.C.
Davies: Do we have to have
these references in the 2006 Act?
|
[18]
Mr
Lewis: Mae’n help i’w cael oherwydd mae’n egluro,
ac mae’n help mawr hefyd pan fyddwch chi’n dysgu
myfyrwyr neu jest yn egluro natur y setliad. Rydych chi’n
dechrau gan ddweud, ‘Wel, edrychwch ar beth mae adran 108(1)
yn ei ddweud. Mae e’n dweud,
|
Mr
Lewis: It is of great
assistance because it provides clarity, and it is also of great
assistance when you are teaching students or simply explaining the
nature of the settlement. You start by saying, ‘Well, look at
what section 108 says. It says,
|
[19]
“an Act of the Assembly may make any provision that
could be made by an Act of Parliament”.
|
[20]
Think about that. What does it mean?’.
|
[21]
Reit? Mae’n helpu yn hynny o beth. Yn gyfreithiol, nid
wyf yn credu ei fod yn angenrheidiol am y rhesymau yr ydych chi
wedi’u rhoi.
|
Right? It helps in
that regard. Legally speaking, I don’t think that it is
necessary for the reasons that you have outlined.
|
[22]
David T.C. Davies: Diolch.
|
David T.C.
Davies: Thank
you.
|
[23]
Professor
Watkin: I agree with what
Emyr Lewis has said on that. I was surprised to see the words
omitted, but, compared with the Scotland Act, of course, we see
that it brings it into line with the fact that there is no such
statement there. The omission worried me, however, in one
particular regard, and that was that it may introduce a suggestion
that there is an inequality between the provisions in an Assembly
Act and an Act of Parliament. In the recent decision in the Supreme
Court in the Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases
(Wales) Bill reference, the majority judgment treated the
legislation of devolved legislatures as being different from that
of the sovereign legislature on the basis that it was open to the
courts, and a human rights issue there, to look at the quality of
decision-making behind the provisions. The minority judgment
disagreed with that and said that there was no logical distinction
for treating the devolved legislatures differently from the UK
Parliament. When I see the omission in that context, it worries me
that it may provide a distinction for future developments of that
nature.
|
[24]
David
Melding: Thank you very
much. I now want to look at the issue of necessity that’s
been introduced, and I’ll ask Mark Williams to
start.
|
[25]
Mark
Williams: Thank you, Mr
Chairman. It’s very good to be here in this joint committee.
As the Chair said, when we talk about necessity tests, I think
that’s one of the real emerging concerns, to date, from the
draft legislation. Firstly, as a general question, could you give
the committee your views on the necessity tests of legislative
competence in clause 3 and paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of new Schedule
7B, and in particular what is likely to be the practical effect of
those provisions?
|
[26]
Mr
Lewis: Wel,
un rhan yw necessity o brofion ar gyfer p’un ai a
yw’r Cynulliad yn gallu deddfu am rai materion penodol.
Felly, dim ond un rhan yw necessity. Felly, os edrychwn ni,
fel enghraifft, ar atodlen 7B(3), sef yr un sy’n ymwneud
â’r gyfraith breifat—os gallaf i ei ffeindio fe;
mae’n ddrwg gen i—fe welwch chi,
|
Mr
Lewis: Well, necessity is
just one part of tests as to whether the Assembly can legislate on
certain specific issues. So, necessity is only one part of that.
Therefore, if we look, for example, at Schedule 7B(3), which
relates to private law—if I can find it; I do
apologise—you will see,
|
[27]
‘A provision
of an Act of the Assembly cannot make modifications of, or confer
power by subordinate legislation to make modifications of, the
private law.’
|
[28]
Ocê? Yna mae diffiniad o ‘the private law’, a
wedyn mae’r peth ei hun yn dweud:
|
Okay? There is
then a definition of ‘the private law’, and then it
goes on to say:
|
[29]
‘Sub-paragraph
(1) does not apply to a modification which…is necessary for a
devolved purpose or is ancillary to a provision made…which
has a devolved purpose, and…has no greater effect on the
general application of the private law than is necessary to give
effect to that purpose.’
|
[30]
Yn
yr achos hwnnw, mae ‘necessary’ yn digwydd ddwywaith,
‘ancillary’ unwaith, ac mae’r ymadroddion
‘devolved purpose’, ‘general application of the
private law’, a ‘has no greater effect...than’.
Mae pob un o’r ymadroddion hyn yn rhai sydd yn cynnig
amwysedd o ran eu dehongliad. Mae pob un yn amwys ac, am y rheswm
yna, fy mhrif gonsýrn i, i ddod at eich cwestiwn chi
ynglŷn â’r effaith ymarferol—mae’n
ddeublyg.
|
In that case,
‘necessary’ occurs twice, ‘ancillary’ once,
and there are the phrases ‘devolved purpose’,
‘general application of the private law’, and
‘has no greater effect…than’. All of these
phrases are ones that actually provide ambiguity in terms of
interpretation. They are all ambiguous and, for that reason my main
concern, to come to your question on the practical effect of
this—it’s twofold.
|
13:45
|
[31]
Yr
effaith ymarferol cyntaf yw: mae e’n mynd i greu nerfusrwydd
yma yng Nghaerdydd, yn y Llywodraeth, o ran yn union ba mor bell y
maen nhw’n gallu deddfu, ond hefyd mae e’n mynd i fod
yn wych i fy mhroffesiwn, oherwydd bob tro bydd achos yn dod
gerbron y llys, lle bo rhywun, er enghraifft, yn cael ei erlyn am
drosedd sydd wedi ei chreu gan ddeddfwriaeth y Cynulliad, mi fydd
ein Perry Masons ni yng Nghymru yn edrych ar hwn ac yn
dweud, ‘Well, let’s have a look now. Is this within
the competence? Is it necessary?’, ac yn y blaen ac yn y
blaen ac yn y blaen. Felly, rwy’n pryderu bod yr ansicrwydd
yma yn y cyd-destun yma yn mynd i beri anhawster.
|
The first is that
it will create some nervousness here in Cardiff, in Government, as
to exactly how far they can take legislation, but also it’s
going to be wonderful for my own profession, because every time a
case comes before the courts where one, perhaps, is prosecuted for
a crime that is made under Assembly legislation, then our Perry
Masons here in Wales will look at this and will say, ‘Well,
let’s have a look now. Is this within the competence—?
Is this within competence? Is it necessary?’, and so on and
so forth. Therefore, I am concerned that this ambiguity in this
context is going to create some difficulty.
|
[32]
Os
caf i ddweud un peth arall ynglŷn â’r necessity
test, fel y mae’n cael ei alw, mae yna rywbeth tebyg yn
Neddf yr Alban 1998. Mae adran—mae’n ddrwg gen
i—mae paragraff 2 a 3, Atodlen 4, Deddf yr Alban 1998 yn
gwneud rhywbeth tebyg. Ond, dim ond mewn perthynas â
reserved matters yw hynny, a hefyd mae o’n eithrio
cyfraith breifat a chyfraith droseddol yr Alban o hynny. Felly,
beth sy’n digwydd yng Nghymru yw dau beth: yn gyntaf oll,
mae’r prawf yn gymhleth iawn, ac yn yr ail le, mae e’n
ehangach o lawer na’r hyn sy’n digwydd yn yr
Alban.
|
If I could make
one further point on the necessity test, as it’s called,
there is something similar in the Scotland Act of 1998.
Section—forgive me—paragraphs 2 and 3 of Schedule 4 to
the Scotland Act of 1998 does something similar. But, that only
happens in relation to reserved matters, and it also exempts
private and criminal law in Scotland. Therefore, what’s
happening in Wales is two things: first of all, the test is very
complex indeed, and, secondly, it is far broader than what happens
in Scotland.
|
[33]
Mark
Williams: Can I just—?
You’ve slightly pre-empted my second question.
|
[34]
Mr
Lewis: Apologies.
|
[35]
Mark
Williams: That’s very
helpful, because there has been a characterisation, in the minimal
debate we’ve had so far, that the necessity test operates in
Scotland and therefore we have nothing to fear. But you’re
clearly telling us they are operating, potentially, under a very
different context.
|
[36]
Mr
Lewis: It operates in
Scotland in a very limited context.
|
[37]
Mewn
cyd-destun cyfyngedig iawn yn unig mae e’n gweithredu yn yr
Alban, ac nid ydw i’n ymwybodol ei
fod e erioed wedi bod ger bron llys yn yr Alban—mae’n
bosib ei fod, ond nid ydw i’n ymwybodol o hynny, a byddwn
i’n fodlon gosod arian ar y tebygolrwydd y byddai’r
darpariaethau ym Mil drafft Cymru yn dod gerbron llys.
|
In a very limited
context—that’s how it’s operated in Scotland, and
I’m not aware that it has ever been before the courts in
Scotland—it is possible that it has been, but I’m not
aware of that, and I would be willing to put money on these
provisions in the draft Wales Bill being before a court of
law.
|
[38]
Professor
Watkin: Can I just come in
there on that point about Scotland, because it goes to a more
general point about the reserved matters. Quite often it’s
characterised that there are fewer problems in Scotland than have
arisen in Wales, and that’s due to the model. I’ve
never been convinced of that—I’ve expressed my views
previously to the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs
Committee.
|
[39]
The
reason, in my view, that there have been fewer problems in Scotland
is that the number of reservations is far smaller, so the space
left in which you can legislate is much greater. That operates also
with regard to this necessity test, because the number of things
that can be hit by the test is very small. If you have a large
number of reserved matters, the chances of being hit by the test
become much greater. So, therefore, the greater the number of
reserved matters, the greater the risk that you will fall foul of
this test, and that all the difficulties that Emyr mentioned could
arise.
|
[40]
One
other thing I’d like to add is: Emyr has talked about the
problems that could arise in litigation and for the Assembly
legislating, and it worries me greatly that this test will also
effect policy development, particularly at the stage when policy is
being turned into legislation. Faced with the question, ‘Is
it necessary to amend the criminal law? Is it necessary to amend
the private law in order to achieve this?’, policy makers
will have a choice. Almost always, therefore, there will be an
alternative choice; you can’t really say that it’s
necessary in that sense. Even if they believe the better choice is
the amendment of private or criminal law, there may be a reluctance
to pursue it if it could lead to litigation and could lead to
references, for example, to the Supreme Court. It would delay
policy implementation, and as a consequence, therefore, there could
well be a timidity, as I’ve called it in the paper I
supplied, in the development of policy.
|
[41]
Mark
Williams: Mr Chairman, just
finally from me on this—the Secretary of State, when he gave
evidence to our committee, set us something of a challenge—it
may be a challenge for you and the groups you work on—when he
said,
|
[42]
‘If there
are better ways of coming up with a mechanism then I would be keen
to hear it, but we have taken the existing wording as
is’.
|
[43]
What
would your advice be on a different mechanism?
|
[44]
Mr
Lewis: Wel,
mae’r Ysgrifennydd Gwladol yn rhannol gywir, oherwydd
mae’r geiriad yma yn debyg iawn i’r geiriad yn yr Alban
sy’n ymwneud â’r reservations yn yr Alban,
ond beth nad ydy’r geiriad yma’n ei gynnwys ydy’r
rhan sydd yn y canol yn eithriad yr Alban, sy’n delio yn unig
â reserved matters, lle mae’n dweud
hyn:
|
Mr
Lewis: Well, the
Secretary of State is partially correct because this wording is
very similar to the wording in Scotland that relates to
reservations in Scotland, but what this wording doesn’t
include is the section that is in the middle of the exception in
Scotland’s case, which deals only with reserved matters,
where it states that:
|
[45]
‘Sub-paragraph
(1) applies in relation to a rule of Scots private law or Scots
criminal law…only to the extent that the rule in question is
special to a reserved matter’.
|
[46]
Felly, mewn geiriau eraill, mae cyfraith breifat a chyfraith
droseddol yr Alban nad yw’n ymwneud â materion wedi eu
cadw yn ôl ar gael. Maen nhw o fewn y cwmpawd deddfu. Dyna
ffordd well o’i gwneud hi, yn fy marn i.
|
So, in other
words, private law and criminal law in Scotland that does not
relate to reserved matters is available. They are within the
legislative scope. That is the more effective way of doing it, in
my view.
|
[47]
Mark
Williams: Thank
you.
|
[48]
David
Melding: Before I move on
to Antoinette, Carolyn, have we covered the
issues—?
|
[49]
Carolyn
Harris: Yes, it’s
been covered; thank you.
|
[50]
David
Melding: And Christina
also.
|
[51]
Christina
Rees: Yes, thank
you.
|
[52]
David
Melding: Then it’s
with you, Antoinette.
|
[53]
Antoinette
Sandbach: Subsection (5)
makes clear that the exemption doesn’t apply, or it
doesn’t apply where there’s a devolved purpose, which
means
|
[54]
‘a purpose,
other than modification of the private law, which does not relate
to a reserved matter’.
|
[55]
Do you
interpret that, therefore, as meaning that that power to amend
private law and criminal law relates to non-reserved matters,
because that’s how it was explained in evidence by the
Secretary of State?
|
[56]
Mr
Lewis: Ydw;
dyna yw’r bwriad, yn sicr.
|
Mr
Lewis: Yes, I do;
that’s the intention, certainly.
|
[57]
That’s the
intention—that’s undoubtedly the intention.
|
[58]
Ond,
hefyd, mae paragraff 1 yn dweud
|
But also,
paragraph 1 states
|
[59]
‘the law on reserved matters’.
|
[60]
Buasai hynny, rwy’n cymryd, yn gallu cynnwys materion
troseddol a phreifat sydd wedi eu cadw yn ôl yn
benodol—expressly reserved
matters.
|
One would assume
that that could include criminal and private law matters that are
specifically reserved—expressly reserved matters.
|
[61]
There
may be expressly reserved criminal or private law matters, which
would fall under paragraph 1, but could still be legislated about
through this ancillary necessary—.
|
[62]
Dyna
yw fy nealltwriaeth i.
|
That is my
understanding.
|
[63]
Antoinette
Sandbach: Because, clearly,
you spoke about the potential for some kind of legal dispute or
challenge, but if it’s been made clear in Hansard that the
purpose of the provision is to ensure that the Assembly has the
power to amend private law or criminal law where necessary to give
effect to its legislation, but it can’t go beyond its
devolved competence, why do you think there would still be a
challenge?
|
[64]
Mr
Lewis: Fy
nealltwriaeth i, o ran sut i ddehongli hwn—. I ddelio â
Hansard i ddechrau, mi fyddai angen i chi ddefnyddio Pepper v. Hart
er mwyn cael hynny i weithio. Nid yw hynny’n sicr o ddigwydd
beth bynnag, o gwbl. Ond, os edrychwn ni ar y geiriad—os
edrychwn ni ar baragraff 4—yn gyntaf oll,
|
Mr
Lewis: My understanding,
with regard to how to interpret this— To deal with Hansard
first of all, you would have to use Pepper v. Hart in order to get
that to work. That is not at all certain to happen, in any case.
But, if we look at the wording—if we look at paragraph
4—then first of all,
|
[65]
the
modification must be
|
|
[66]
‘ancillary
to a provision...which has a devolved purpose’
|
[67]
ac
wedyn
|
and
then
|
[68]
‘has no
greater effect on the general application of the criminal law than
is necessary to give effect to the purpose of that
provision’.
|
[69]
Nid
yw hynny’n eglur i fi—ddim o gwbl. Beth yw
‘general effect’, a ble mae necessity yn
dod i mewn? Pwy sy’n barnu beth yw
‘necessity’? Ai’r deddfwyr, fel y mae
Thomas wedi awgrymu, neu’r llysoedd? Rwy’n credu,
efallai, mai’r ffordd hawsaf o ddelio â’r pwynt yw
edrych ar fel y mae pethau yn awr—y status quo. Nid
yw’r cyfyngiadau yma’n bodoli o ran gallu’r
Cynulliad i ddeddfu nawr. Nid oes necessity test, nid oes
ancillary test mewn perthynas—
|
That is not clear
to me—not at all. What is ‘general effect’, and
where does necessity come into this? Who decides what constitutes
‘necessity’? Is it the legislators, as Thomas has
suggested, or the courts? I think, perhaps, that the easiest way to
deal with the point is to look at how things are now—the
status quo. These restrictions don’t exist at present in
terms of the Assembly’s legislative powers. There is no
necessity test, there is no ancillary test in relation
to—
|
[70]
Antoinette
Sandbach: I accept that, but
that distinction between private law and non-devolved
function—was that not the concern in the referral of the
asbestosis case on the recovery of medical costs?
|
[71]
Mr
Lewis: Wel,
mae yna un darn o ddyfarniad yr Arglwydd Mance yn y penderfyniad
hwnnw, lle mae o’n dweud rhywbeth fel, ‘Whatever
this meant’—a ‘this’ oedd
‘the funding of the NHS in Wales’, rwy’n
credu—‘Whatever this meant, it didn’t mean
amending the law of tort and contract’. Wel, rwy’n
credu bod yr achos yna yn un arbennig o ran ei ffeithiau, a dweud y
gwir, ac mae’n eithaf eglur o’r ffordd y mae’r
Cynulliad wedi deddfu heb her ym meysydd troseddol ac yn y maes
preifat, heb orfod poeni am y prawf necessity yma, fod y
gallu yna ar hyn o bryd.
|
Mr
Lewis: Well, there is one
section of Lord Mance’s judgment in that decision where he
says something like, ‘Whatever this meant’—and
‘this’ meant ‘the funding of the NHS in
Wales’, I believe—‘Whatever this meant, it
didn’t mean amending the law of tort and contract’.
Well, I think that that case is very relevant, and it’s quite
clear from the way in which the Assembly has legislated without
challenge in criminal and private law, without having to be
concerned about this necessity test, that the competence is there
at present.
|
[72]
Antoinette Sandbach: I’m
interested that you say that the Assembly has legislated without
challenge, because there have been a number of referrals now to the
Supreme Court, in a very short space of time, of
legislation.
|
[73]
Mr
Lewis: Maybe I should
repeat—or maybe not repeat what I said, but explain what I
said. I didn’t say ‘without
challenge’—
|
[74]
Antoinette
Sandbach: That’s how
it was translated.
|
[75]
Mr
Lewis: Yes, in the sense
of not having been challenged at all. Not having been challenged on
its ability to modify private law or modify criminal law is what I
meant, and I probably didn’t say that, so, fair
enough.
|
[76]
Digon
teg.
|
Fair
enough.
|
[77]
Antoinette
Sandbach: But if the
intention of the Act is to ensure that that purpose
remains—in other words, there’s an ability to legislate
to give effect to changes in private law or criminal law in
devolved areas but not in reserved—what is it that needs to
change in the wording of these two particular—? How would you
amend these two provisions?
|
[78]
Mr
Lewis: Buaswn yn eu tynnu allan.
|
Mr
Lewis: I’d remove
them.
|
[79]
I’d remove
them.
|
[80]
Antoinette
Sandbach: But then
you’d still have the problem that exists with the Government
of Wales Act and the challenges that have led to the Supreme Court
referrals as they’ve existed already.
|
[81]
Mr
Lewis: Nid
wyf yn credu—. Rydych yn rhoi Cymru ar yr un gwastad
â’r Alban. Nid oes heriau tebyg wedi bod mewn perthynas
â’r Alban—nid bod hynny ynddi ei hun yn ddadl dda.
O dan y drefn newydd, y drefn o gael pwerau wedi’u cadw
nôl, y cwestiwn yw: ‘Does it relate to
a reserved matter?’ Dyna’r unig gwestiwn. Felly, os ydy o’n
newid y gyfraith droseddol, neu os ydy o’n newid y gyfraith
breifat, os ydy o’n ymwneud â reserved matter,
dyna ni. Dyna’r cwestiwn. Nid oes angen y pethau eraill,
felly, yn fy marn i.
|
Mr
Lewis: I don’t
think—. You’re putting Wales on the same level as
Scotland. There have been no similar challenges in relation to
Scotland—not that that in itself is a strong argument. Under
the new system, the reserved-powers model is, the question is: does
it relate to a reserved matter? That’s the only question.
Therefore, if it changes criminal law or if it changes private law,
if it relates to a reserved matter, then that’s it.
That’s the question. There is no need for these other things,
in my view.
|
[82]
Professor
Watkin: If I can just come
in on that, what worries me about these two provisions is that, as
has been said, they open up the ground for a set of challenges on
new issues, which previously were not open to challenge. That
worries me in two ways. Firstly, I’m not quite certain why
one would want to give the citizen the right to challenge on these
grounds, because the purpose of the private law and criminal law
restrictions is explicitly stated in the explanatory notes to be to
defend the unified jurisdiction. I would have thought that that was
something that would be provided for in terms of a challenge prior
to enactment if those who have responsibility for the jurisdiction
wish to do so. I don’t see that a post-enactment challenge is
really in place. Of course, if one accepts that, it does rather
expose the fact that what we are dealing with here is not a legal
challenge to the competence of the Assembly in terms of its
legislative competence, but rather a different sort of power of
intervention whereby there would be a power to intervene where it
is felt that the Assembly has gone further than someone else thinks
is necessary in order to carry out a policy by amending private law
or criminal law. I think it would be more, if I can say so, honest
to say that this belongs more in the category of intervention power
than reference on legislative competence.
|
[83]
Antoinette
Sandbach: So, are you
saying, then, that the private citizen in Scotland does not have
that basis to challenge on the necessity test that is there, or do
they?
|
[84]
Professor
Watkin: Well, in relation
to whether or not a reserved matter has been trespassed upon, yes,
but not in relation to private law and criminal law—not in
relation to the means by which the Scottish Parliament chooses to
give effect to its policies, other than in terms of whether or not
human rights have been affected.
|
[85]
Antoinette
Sandbach: Thank
you.
|
[86]
David
Melding: Alun
Davies.
|
[87]
Alun
Davies: Thank you. It
appears to me that the introduction of both the necessity tests and
also the number of restrictions through the reserved powers means
that the ability of the Assembly to act in an uncontested way is
going to be significantly reduced. If you accept that proposition,
then the sort of law that the Assembly will be able to produce here
will be law that will add to complexity rather than reduce
complexity.
|
14:00
|
[88]
If
I’m thinking back to the Control of Horses (Wales) Act 2014,
for argument’s sake, the clear, driving objective there was
an animal welfare issue, but, in order to address that animal
welfare issue, we had to address a series of issues in terms of
human rights, and in terms of property and the rest of it. It
appears to me now that, looking at the barriers we had to cross in
order to get that first of all to the Assembly and then onto the
statute book, that would be more difficult, would mean that we
would have to legislate in a more restricted way, and would
mean—. I would have thought that the implication of that is
that the statute book becomes more crowded, less clear and that we
have a confusion of law in Wales, and that we don’t also
enable this place to have greater coherence in policy making and
legislative competence. Is that the sort of assumption that you
would agree with?
|
[89]
Professor
Watkin: It has been my
fear from the first that there was this belief, as I said, that
moving to a reserved-powers model would of itself be a panacea for
the difficulties that have arisen. The worry that I’ve had
about it is that, if you have a large number of reserved matters,
and then add to them things that relate to those reserved matters,
then in point of fact you can have a greatly restricted area of
competence. The freedom of the Assembly to legislate within that
area will then be compromised. If you add to that the other
restrictions that are now being added about private law and
criminal law, it is a further erosion of that power.
|
[90]
I
think that Mr Davies is correct in what he’s saying, that
what this may end up producing is laws that have to steer very
carefully around all these restrictions unless they’re going
to be open to challenge, with the result that complex competence
results in highly complex legislation. I think one can actually
look at the legislative history of the Assembly and see that. If we
go back to the third Assembly, and the previous settlement under
Part 3 and Schedule 5, competence granted by the insertion of
matters into Schedule 5 was often extremely complicated. Witness,
for example, the National Assembly for Wales (Legislative
Competence) (Welsh Language) Order 2009. There is much criticism
these days of the complexity of the Welsh Language (Wales) Measure
2011, but the complexity of that Measure is entirely the result of
the complexity of the competence that was granted. It is steering
its way round the very complicated detail and restrictions that
were imposed when the powers were granted from Westminster. I
worry, therefore, that, if we are moving into an area where there
is again a complex set of rules about competence, the ultimate
result is legislation that is difficult to understand, complex, and
inaccessible to the citizen and possibly even to the
citizen’s legal advisers.
|
[91]
David
Melding: Suzy.
|
[92]
Suzy
Davies: Thank you.
Obviously this Bill, and the evidence that we’re taking, is
about trying to find out where the line is between the competence
of the two legislatures, and in that we’ve got to look at
intention and definition. So, the first question I wanted to ask
you is: do you think this Bill, as it is drafted at the moment,
evidences an intention that the Government of the day thinks that
the decision on the Agricultural Wages (Wales) Bill went too far,
and this is an attempt to try and recover ground, and then,
secondly, whether you think that the definitions used in the Bill
at the moment are of themselves problematic, because they still,
despite attempts to be as tight as they can, leave open too much
space for interpretation?
|
[93]
Mr
Lewis: Os
caf i ddelio â rhan gyntaf eich cwestiwn chi, roedd yr achos
yn ymwneud â chyflogau amaethyddol wedi gwireddu’r hyn a
oedd nifer o bobl wedi’i ddarogan, sef bod y setliad
presennol yn cynnig posibiliadau a hyblygrwydd deddfu a oedd yn
ehangach na beth oedd pobl wedi’i ystyried oherwydd y
materion distaw, y silent subjects, yma. Os ydych
chi’n edrych ar oblygiadau hynny, maen nhw’n
bellgyrhaeddol, o leiaf mewn egwyddor. Er enghraifft, mewn
egwyddor, o bosib—mae yna ddadleuon, beth
bynnag—gallasai’r Cynulliad ddeddfu mewn materion sydd,
o safbwynt y Deyrnas Gyfunol, yn bethau a ddylai fod yn cael eu
deddfu arnyn nhw yn Llundain, megis y fyddin, amddiffyn y
wladwriaeth, mewnfudo.
|
Mr
Lewis: If I may deal with
the first part of your question, the case in relation to
agricultural wages had brought about what a number of people had
forecast, which is that the current settlement offers possibilities
and flexibility in terms of legislation that were wider than people
had thought because of those silent subjects. If you look at the
implications of that, then they are very far reaching, at least in
principle. For example, in principle, possibly—there are
arguments, anyway—the Assembly could legislate on matters
that are, from the point of view of the United Kingdom, things that
should be legislated on in London, such as the army, defence of the
state, and immigration.
|
[94]
Oherwydd bod y rhain yn silent subjects, mewn theori fe
allasid estyn at y rheini, ac mae rhywun yn gallu gweld pam wedyn,
o safbwynt yr undeb, fod angen diwygio er mwyn sicrhau bod y
materion hynny sydd yn ymwneud â’r wladwriaeth Brydeinig
yn aros yn San Steffan, fel sy’n digwydd gyda’r Alban
ac fel sy’n digwydd gyda Gogledd Iwerddon, er y gellid
dadlau, fel y mae Thomas Watkin yn ei wneud yn ei dystiolaeth, fod
pobl Cymru wedi pleidleisio o blaid hynny. Rwy’n credu mai un
rhan o’r hafaliad yw hynny; mae hynny’n iawn. Yr hyn
sy’n fy mhryderu i yw, ar ben hynny, mae’r cyfyngiadau
newydd yma yn erydu tiriogaeth sydd gan y Cynulliad nad ydy
hi’n deg—i ddefnyddio un o feini prawf yr Ysgrifennydd
Gwladol—ei chymryd i ffwrdd, yn arbennig mewn perthynas
â chyfraith breifat a chyfraith droseddol. Mae’r
estyniad hynny o’r egwyddor, hefyd yr hyn y mae Thomas wedi
cyfeirio ato eto, sef y rhestr faith o faterion sydd wedi’u
heithrio—mae’r pethau yna ynghyd fel pe baent yn rhyw
ymgais i adennill tir ar ôl yr achos rŷch chi wedi
sôn amdano sydd yn mynd yn rhy bell. Felly, mewn geiriau
eraill, mae yna gyfiawnhad mewn cymryd peth o’r diriogaeth yn
ei hôl, ond nid ydy hynny’n rheswm digonol dros gau
gymaint o diriogaeth.
|
Because these are
silent subjects, in theory those might be extended, and one can
see, therefore, from the point of view of the union, why there is a
need for reform to ensure that those matters that relate to the
British state remain in Westminster, as happens with Scotland and
as happens with Northern Ireland, although it could be argued, as
Thomas Watkin does in his evidence, that the people of Wales had
voted in favour of that. I think that’s one part of the
equation; that’s right. What concerns me is that, on top of
that, these new restrictions erode the Assembly’s powers and
that it’s not fair—to use one of the criteria of the
Secretary of State—to take those away, particularly in
relation to private and criminal law. That extension of the
principle, and also what Thomas has referred to again, which is the
long list of matters that are excepted—those things seem put
together in some kind of attempt to make up ground following the
case that you’ve mentioned that goes too far. So, in other
words, there’s a justification in taking some of that ground
back, but that’s not a sufficient reason for clawing back so
much ground.
|
[95]
Suzy
Davies: Thank you. On the
second part about the definitions themselves being as much a
problem as that they’re trying to solve, I’ll give you
one, devolved purpose. Let us focus on one.
|
[96]
Mr
Lewis: Mewn
unrhyw ddeddfwriaeth, rŷch chi’n gallu ffeindio mwy nag
un ystyr os ydych chi’n gyfreithiwr da, a hyd yn oed os ydych
chi’n gyfreithiwr gwael. Mae amwysedd yn mynd i fodoli. Mae
diffiniadau yn ymgais i geisio egluro rhywbeth neu geisio torri i
lawr y posibiliadau ar gyfer dadleuon twp, yn aml. A ydy’r
diffiniad yma yn cau i lawr bob dadl dwp bosib? Na, nid ydw
i’n credu ei fod e; mae’n siŵr y gellid tynhau,
ond nid ydw i wedi edrych yn fanwl ar hynny.
|
Mr
Lewis: Within any
legislation, you can find more than one meaning if you are a good
lawyer, and even if you are a poor lawyer. There will be ambiguity.
Definitions are an attempt to try to explain something or to try
and cut down on the possibilities for foolish arguments, often.
Does this definition close down every possible foolish argument?
No, I don’t think it does; I’m sure it could be
tightened up, but I haven’t looked at it in
detail.
|
[97]
Suzy
Davies: Diolch yn
fawr.
|
Suzy
Davies: Thank
you.
|
[98]
David
Melding: Thank you. We want
to look now at Minister of the Crown functions and issues relating
to that, and I’ll ask Christina Rees to take us through this
question.
|
[99]
Christina
Rees: Do you agree that
Minister of the Crown consents are an anachronism that should be
abolished apart from in exceptional circumstances?
|
[100]
Professor
Watkin: The retention of
the need for consent for the conferral, imposition, removal or
modification of Minister of the Crown functions is, I think, in
some ways anachronistic, but, here again, we actually face a
situation where some things have been clawed back that were
previously enjoyed by the Assembly. I think that the first two
points I would want to make are that that fact—the loss of
the power to legislate on incidental and consequential matters in
order to remove or modify—is, in effect, a recovery of the
ground that was lost in the Local Government Byelaws (Wales) Bill
reference. There’s also the loss of the fact that it was only
pre-commencement functions to which the consent provision applied,
so it’s now applying across the board.
|
[101]
This
is an interesting issue. It’s an interesting issue firstly
because there is no doubt in my mind that the change that is
proposed in the Bill increases clarity, because the rule now
becomes clear. Wherever you confer, impose, remove or modify, you
need consent. That gets rid of the doubtful matter, unless
it’s incidental or consequential, about who decides that. But
it increases clarity at a cost, and the cost is paid for in a loss
of competence, and it raises the question of ‘clarity for
whom’. It’s clear when Minister of the Crown consent is
needed, but not clear to the Assembly when it can legislate,
necessarily, without it. If I could compare it perhaps with the
situation where you have an examination hall and candidates sitting
a three-hour exam, you put a notice on the wall that says
‘Candidates may not leave the hall during the first half hour
of the examination’. The rule is clear: the candidates know
where they stand. A different rule is put up: ‘Candidates may
not leave the hall without the permission of the chief
invigilator’. The rule is clear, but the candidates
don’t know where they stand, and the Assembly is in the
latter position as a result of what is now being suggested. The
rule is clarified, but the Assembly is left guessing.
|
[102]
I feel
that, in a sense, there may well be a need in relation to certain
functions and in effect across the border that something of this
nature is required, but there are other, I think, preferable
solutions. And the time has come, if this is truly going to be a
lasting settlement, not to find another accommodation but to cut
the Gordian knot and put things on a stable basis, with clarity for
all parties.
|
[103]
Christina
Rees: Thank you. Could I
move on from that and ask: what is your assessment of the
definition of a ‘reserved authority’ and that potential
impact on legislative competence?
|
[104]
Mr
Lewis: Wel,
mae hwn yn gysyniad newydd fan hyn, ac mae o’n cynnwys, wrth
gwrs, Gweinidogion y Goron. Felly, mae Gweinidogion y Goron
a’r awdurdodau eraill yma nad ydynt yn awdurdodau Cymreig,
mae angen cydsyniad Gweinidog y Goron cyn deddfu amdanyn nhw.
Mae’n ddiddorol cymharu â’r Alban. Yn yr Alban,
mae yna drosglwyddo pwerau gweithredol Gweinidogion y Goron yn
llwyr i Lywodraeth, Gweinidogion yr Alban, o dan adran 53,
rwy’n credu, Deddf yr Alban 2012. Maen nhw i gyd yn
trosglwyddo oni bai eu bod nhw wedi eu heithrio yn benodol. Nid yw
hynny wedi digwydd yn y drafft yma, felly mae gyda ni y cysyniad
bod unrhyw swyddogaeth, hyd yn oed os ydy o fewn libart deddfu y
Cynulliad a nad yw yn reserved, unrhyw bŵer sydd yn
eistedd yn Llundain—ac mae Thomas yn sôn am yr
enghraifft o gyflogau athrawon; nad oes dim modd deddfu am hwnnw
heb ganiatâd Llundain. Felly, mae hwn yn newid y sefyllfa ar
hyn o bryd, lle nad oes modd deddfu ynglŷn â phwerau cyn
mis Mai 2011—pre-commencement powers, fel maen
nhw’n cael eu galw.
|
Mr
Lewis: Well, this is a
new concept in this place, and it includes, of course, Ministers of
the Crown. So, Ministers of the Crown and these other authorities
that aren’t Welsh authorities, Minister of the Crown consent
is needed before legislating on them. It’s interesting to
compare with the situation in Scotland. In Scotland, there is a
transfer of executive powers of Ministers of the Crown in their
entirety to the Scottish Government and to Scottish Ministers under
section 53, I believe, of the Scotland Act 2012. They all transfer
unless they are specifically exempted. That hasn’t happened
in this draft, so we have this concept that any function, even if
it is within the legislative scope of the Assembly and isn’t
reserved, any power that lies in London—and Thomas talked
about the example of teachers’ pay; it is not possible to
legislate on that without the consent of London. So, that’s a
change in the current situation, where there is no means of
legislating in relation to powers before May
2011—pre-commencement powers, as they’re
called.
|
[105]
Ond
wedyn, wrth gwrs, mae’n ymestyn hefyd i diriogaeth arall, ac
un enghraifft gwerth sôn amdani, er enghraifft, yw’r
Human Tissue Authority. Fe ddeddfodd y Cynulliad mewn perthynas
â rhoi organau. Mi osododd swyddogaethau ar yr Human Tissue
Authority. Nid oedd angen cydsyniad ar gyfer gwneud hynny. Mi fydd
angen cydsyniad. Rwy’n credu bod hwn yn un o’r lleoedd
lle mae’r Ysgrifennydd Gwladol a’r Prif Weinidog,
Carwyn Jones yn gytûn y byddai angen cydsyniad ar gyfer gwneud
hynny. Felly, fel y mae Thomas yn dweud, mae wedi cymryd pwerau yn
eu hôl o le mae Cymru ar hyn o bryd.
|
But then, of
course, it also extends to new ground, and one example worth
mentioning is the Human Tissue Authority. The Assembly legislated
in relation to organ donation. It placed functions on the Human
Tissue Authority. Consent was not required to do that. Consent will
now be needed. I think that’s one area where the First
Minister and the Secretary of State are agreed that there would
need to be consent for doing that. So, as Thomas has said, it has
taken powers back from the current situation in Wales.
|
[106]
Christina
Rees: Just a
supplementary on that: do you think that’s a particular case,
because, in the case of the Bill that you’ve mentioned,
transplant tissue would be available throughout the UK, so
therefore it would necessarily need that?
|
[107]
Mr
Lewis: Rwy’n deall y rhesymeg pam mae rhai awdurdodau sydd yn
weithredol ar draws ffiniau cenedlaethol mewnol y Deyrnas Gyfunol
yn rhai lle mae pwerau yn cael eu cadw’n ôl yn Llundain.
Ond rwy’n credu bod y broblem yn ymwneud â’r
syniad yma o gydsyniad gweinidogol. Naill ai maen nhw’n
reserved neu nad ydyn nhw ddim, ond mae’r rhain fel pe
baent mewn rhyw dir canol.
|
Mr
Lewis: I understand the
reason why some authorities that do operate across national
boundaries within the United Kingdom are those where the powers are
reserved to London. But I think the problem arises in relation to
this concept of Minister of the Crown consent. They are either
reserved or they’re not, but these seem to be in some sort of
middle ground.
|
[108]
Christina
Rees: Okay. Do you think
they should be listed in the Bill?
|
[109]
Mr
Lewis: Buasai hynny yn ei gwneud hi’n llawer
eglurach.
|
Mr
Lewis: That would make it
much clearer.
|
[110]
It
would make it much clearer.
|
[111]
Byddai’n llawer eglurach.
|
It would be much
clearer.
|
[112]
Christina
Rees: Okay.
|
14:15
|
[113]
Professor
Watkin: I think you have
to have one of two things: you either need a list of what the
reserved authorities are, or you need a test that will give us
what, in some areas of the law, is called conceptual certainty, so
that you can actually say, according to that test, whether an
authority is a reserved authority or not, and say that without any
room for doubt. If you have any room for doubt, the test
doesn’t work. I think that that would be a very
unsatisfactory place to end up. I noticed that, in the definition,
it talks about offices and holders of offices that have public
functions. This is a very, very difficult area of the law, which
has exercised the courts recently. It is, I think, being looked at
currently by the Law Commission in relation to some of its work,
and it strikes me as very odd therefore to go down that line as a
way of trying to solve difficulties of interpretation and
definition in a settlement of legislative competence for a
democratically elected body.
|
[114]
Christina
Rees: Thank
you.
|
[115]
David
Melding: Antoinette, did
you want to follow up something on this issue of Crown
consent?
|
[116]
Antoinette
Sandbach: Yes, I wanted to
come back to what you’d said earlier in your evidence to Suzy
Davies in response to her question as to whether or not this Bill
was a response to the decision of the judges on the agricultural
wages Bill and, in fact, the Minister of Crown functions in
relation to the local government bye-laws Bill. What’s the
constitutional position if the Supreme Court makes decisions in law
that aren’t agreed with by the UK Parliament? If the UK
Parliament thinks that Supreme Court judges are making law that
didn’t reflect the law that was the law of Parliament, does
Parliament have the right then to pass a law that does reflect what
it says?
|
[117]
Mr
Lewis: Absolutely.
|
[118]
Antoinette
Sandbach: Because we
don’t have judge-made—. Well, we do have judge-made law
in this country, but Parliament is always supreme. So, your
arguments are expressed on the basis that, in fact, Parliament is
taking powers back, but if those powers have been granted by
Supreme Court decisions and weren’t the original intention of
Parliament, is it really a taking back of those powers?
|
[119]
Mr
Lewis: Wel,
rwy’n credu mai’r sefyllfa gyfreithiol yw mai bwriad y
Senedd yw’r hyn sydd yn y Ddeddf.
|
Mr
Lewis: Well, I believe
that the legal situation is that the intention of Parliament is
what is in the Act.
|
[120]
The
intention of Parliament is what is in the legislation.
|
[121]
Mae
hynny’n cynnwys Deddf Llywodraeth Cymru 2006. Dehongli y
Ddeddf y mae’r barnwyr yn ei wneud. Os nad yw’r
ddeddfwrfa yn hoffi y dyfarniad, yna wrth gwrs nid oes neb yn
dadlau na all y ddeddfwrfa sofran newid y Ddeddf. Nid dadl
gyfreithiol, mewn ffordd, yw hyn; mae’n ddadl wleidyddol efo
‘w’ fach. Rhaid inni beidio ag anghofio, yn ogystal
â’r ffaith bod Deddf wedi bod, mae yna hefyd refferendwm
wedi bod, yn 2011. Felly, fel y mae Thomas eto yn ei ddweud yn ei
dystiolaeth ardderchog, cyn eich bod chi yn lliniaru neu’n
gwanhau y sefyllfa sydd wedi cael ei phleidleisio arni drwy
refferendwm, mae eisiau bod yn ofalus iawn.
|
That includes the
Government of Wales Act 2006. The judges interpret that Act. If the
legislature does not like that judgment, then of course nobody is
arguing that the sovereign legislature cannot change the Act. This
is not a legal argument, in a way; it’s a political argument
with a small ‘p’. We mustn’t forget that, as well
as there being an Act, there has also been a referendum, in 2011.
So, as Thomas also says in his excellent evidence, before you
dilute the situation that has been voted on in the referendum, you
have to be very careful.
|
[122]
Antoinette
Sandbach: Sorry—
|
[123]
David
Melding: I’m not sure
that we need to develop this point particularly because I think
most of us would agree—well, everyone here would
agree—that the Supreme Court has a right of interpretation
and justified inference from statute, but if a statute changes or
is amended, that sets the position until there’s further
interpretation of what was meant in areas of ambiguity potentially.
I’m quite keen to look at the list of reservations, and Liz
Saville Roberts will put this question to you.
|
[124]
Liz
Saville Roberts: Diolch yn fawr iawn. Un o’r pethau sydd wedi fy nharo i
nid jest yn y drafodaeth rwan hyn, ond cyn hynny, yw ein bod yn
trafod rhai o’r cysyniadau ac egwyddorion mawr, ac efallai ar
draul y rhestr. Efallai nad ydym yn rhoi digon o sylw, hwyrach,
i’r rhestr o bwerau a gedwir yn ôl. Un peth, jest o ran
egwyddor, hoffwn ofyn: ai model o bwerau a gedwir yn ôl mewn
enw yn unig sydd gennym yma, fel term bachog, hwylus? Ond buaswn yn
leicio gofyn eich barn chi am y rhestr hirfaith o faterion, ac
ynghylch cynnwys y rhestr a’i heffaith potensial. Hefyd, a
ydyw’n destun pryder ein bod, efallai, heb roi digon o sylw,
hyd yn hyn, a digon o graffu iddynt?
|
Liz Saville
Roberts: Thank you very
much. One of the things that struck me not only in the debate this
afternoon, but also prior to this debate, is that we are discussing
some major concepts and principles at the expense, perhaps, of the
list of reservations. Perhaps we are not giving sufficient coverage
to the list of reserved powers. One thing, as a point of principle:
do we have a reserved-powers model in name alone here? I’d
also like to ask for your views on this lengthy list of
reservations, on the content of the list and its potential impact.
Also, is it a cause of concern that perhaps, to date, we have not
given sufficient attention and scrutinised this list
adequately?
|
[125]
Yr
Athro Watkin: Nid
wyf i wedi edrych yn fanwl ar y rhestr o bwerau sydd yn cael eu
cadw nôl, oherwydd rwy’n credu bod eisiau barn
arbenigwyr, nid yn unig yn y gyfraith, ond ar sail polisi i weld
sut mae’n mynd i effeithio ar eu gwaith nhw. Beth rwy’n
ofni yn y sefyllfa yma yw bod cymaint o gwestiynau yn
codi—cwestiynau o bwys—o gwmpas y rhestr, i wneud
â phethau fel a ydy e’n angenrheidiol i’r rheini,
y newidiadau i swyddogaethau Gweinidogion y Goron, a’r fath
bethau. Mae’r ddadl yn symud at y pethau yna ac rydym
ni’n colli golwg ar y pethau mwyaf pwysig. Hynny yw: pa
bwerau sydd yna er mwyn i’r Cynulliad ddeddfu arnyn nhw?
Rwy’n ofni, efallai, ar ddiwedd y dydd, dyna le fyddwn
ni’n diweddu lan, gyda rhyw fath o gonsensws ynglŷn
â’r pethau o gwmpas y setliad, ond yn derbyn, heb ddigon
o ddadansoddiad, yr hyn sydd yng nghanol y setliad, a hynny yw,
wrth gwrs, y pwerau sydd yn cael eu neilltuo ac effaith hynny ar
bwerau’r Cynulliad i ddeddfu.
|
Professor
Watkin: I haven’t
looked at the list of reserved powers in detail, because I think
you need the views of experts, not just on the law, but on the
basis of policy to see how it will affect their work. What
I’m concerned about in this situation is that there are so
many questions arising—important questions—around the
list to do with things like whether it is necessary, the changes to
functions of Ministers of the Crown, and so on. The debate is
moving towards those things and we’re losing sight of the
more important things. Those things are: what powers are there so
that the Assembly can legislate on them? I am concerned that,
ultimately, that’s where we’ll end up, with some kind
of consensus about the matters around the settlement, but
accepting, without sufficient analysis, what is at the core of the
settlement, and that is, of course, the reserved powers and their
effect on the powers of the Assembly to legislate.
|
[126]
Mr
Lewis: Cytuno.
|
Mr
Lewis: I would
agree.
|
[127]
David
Melding: There may be a
Member trying to attract my eye. Well, let’s look at the
issue of a separate Welsh jurisdiction, which has been caught up in
the whole discussion of the draft Bill, it’s fair to say, and
I’ll ask William Powell to start.
|
[128]
William
Powell: Diolch, Gadeirydd.
I believe you’ve previously both helped this committee in our
consideration of the merits and otherwise of a separate Welsh
jurisdiction, but is it your view that there can be an effective
implementation of a reserved-powers model, or more easily, under
such a separate legal jurisdiction for Wales?
|
[129]
Mr
Lewis: Rwy’n credu bod y gair
‘jurisdiction,’ neu ‘awdurdodaeth’
sydd wedi tueddu cael ei ddefnyddio yn y ddisgẃrs Gymraeg, yn
air sydd yn cymylu rhai o’r cwestiynau creiddiol. Mae
awdurdodaeth a jurisdiction yn golygu pa lysoedd sydd yn
cael clywed pa achosion—pa lysoedd sydd ag awdurdodaeth dros
achosion penodol. Yn aml iawn, fe ddiffinnir hynny mewn
termau’r math o gyfraith—cyfraith droseddol neu
gyfraith sifil—neu mewn termau o diriogaeth. Hynny yw, pan
ddechreuais i weithio fel cyfreithiwr, roedd llysoedd ynadon
Pontlotyn ac Aberdâr ac ati yn clywed achosion a oedd yn dod
o’r cylch, ac roedd yn rhaid ichi eu trosglwyddo nhw’n
ffurfiol.
|
Mr
Lewis: I believe the word
‘jurisdiction,’ or ‘awdurdodaeth’ as
is used generally in Welsh, is a word that clouds some of these
core considerations. Jurisdiction and awdurdodaeth mean
which courts can hear which cases—which courts have
jurisdiction over specific cases. Very often, that is defined in
terms of what sort of law we’re dealing with—criminal
law or civil law—or in terms of territory. That is, when I
started to work as a lawyer, the Pontlottyn, Aberdare and other
magistrates’ courts heard cases from that locality, and you
had to transfer them formally.
|
[130]
Nid
wyf yn credu mai gwraidd y broblem yw awdurdodaeth llysoedd.
Gwraidd y broblem yw: ar y naill law bod gennym ni’r cysyniad
o gyfraith Cymru a Lloegr—the laws of England and
Wales—ac, ar y llaw arall, mae gennym ni gyfreithiau sydd
yn wahanol yng Nghymru ac yn Lloegr. Mae gennym ni the laws that
apply in Wales and the laws that apply in England. Maen
nhw’n mynd yn fwy gwahanol i’w gilydd. Ond, ar yr un
pryd, rŷm ni’n ceisio cadw’r cysyniad yma mai dim
ond un law of England and Wales sy’n
bodoli.
|
I believe that the
root of the problem is not the jurisdiction of the courts, but it
is that, on the one hand, we have the concept of the laws of
England and Wales, and, on the other, we have laws that are
different in Wales and in England. We have the laws that apply in
Wales and the laws that apply in England. They are diverging more
and more. But, simultaneously, we are trying to retain this concept
that there is only one law of England and Wales.
|
[131]
Fy
mhryder i yw, er mwyn ceisio cynnal beth rwy’n credu
sy’n baradocs, mae yna lot o gymhlethdod a lot o ddrafftio
cymhleth yn digwydd er mwyn ceisio cynnal y paradocs hwnnw. Fy marn
bersonol i yw y byddai’n llawer haws pe baem ni’n
cydnabod bod yna gyfraith Cymru—a law of Wales—a
chyfraith Lloegr—a law of England—sydd yn
gweithredu o fewn tiriogaeth Cymru—the territory of
Wales—a thiriogaeth Lloegr—the territory of
England. Ni fyddai hynny ynddo’i hun yn eich gorfodi chi
i ddatganoli gweinyddu cyfiawnder, i sefydlu llysoedd neu system o
lysoedd ar wahân yng Nghymru, nac i sefydlu proffesiynau
cyfreithiol ar wahân rhwng Cymru a Lloegr. Nid oes yn rhaid
ichi gael yr holl bethau yma.
|
My concern is
that, in order to try and maintain what I believe is a paradox,
there is a great deal of complexity and a great deal of very
complex drafting going on in order to try and maintain that
paradox. My personal view is that it would be far easier if we were
to acknowledge that there is a law of Wales and a law of England,
that operate within the territory of Wales and the territory of
England. That, in and of itself, wouldn’t force you to
devolve the administration of justice, to establish separate courts
or a separate system of courts in Wales, or to establish separate
professions in England and Wales. You don’t have to have all
of those things.
|
[132]
Fy
mhryder i yw bod yr holl sôn am awdurdodaeth wedi codi’r
holl gwestiynau atodol yma, lle mae’r broblem ei hun yn un
llawer mwy syml. Fy marn i yw, pe baech chi’n mynd at
ddatganiad o ddweud ‘Cyfraith Cymru a chyfraith
Lloegr’, mi fyddai hynny’n gwneud y setliad yma’n
llawer mwy eglur, yn llawer mwy ymarferol ac yn llawer symlach
hefyd. Dyna fy marn i, beth bynnag.
|
My concern is that
all this talk of jurisdiction has raised all of these supplementary
questions, where the problem itself is far simpler. My view is that
if you were to move to a statement saying that there is a law of
Wales and a law of England, that would make this settlement far
clearer, far more practical and far simpler, too. That’s my
view, at least.
|
[133]
Professor
Watkin: I mean,
there’s one word, I think, that you used in your question
that I would disagree with, and that’s the word
‘separate’. There
doesn’t need to be a separate jurisdiction in the sense of a
separate legal system. I think it is sufficient that you have
courts in Wales, as Emyr has said, that have the authority to apply
the law that applies in Wales and likewise in England, and, of
course, a concurrent authority to apply the law that is common to
both countries. That really duplicates what was done at the end of
the nineteenth century with the creation of the High Court and the
Court of Appeal, which had full authority to implement common law
and equity—two distinct systems of law—without actually
necessarily merging them—jurisdiction over the two bodies of
law, but in the same court. Well, we’d only be doing the same
thing, but this time not on the basis of the body of law, but on
the basis of the territory where it applies.
|
[134]
William
Powell: I’m very
grateful for that clarification. In the context of what
you’ve both said, do you believe that the proposals that were
set out recently in the Wales Governance Centre and the
constitution unit’s report, ‘Delivering a Reserved
Powers Model of Devolution for Wales’, could actually have
the desired effect and maybe draw on the kind of thinking that
you’ve outlined?
|
[135]
Mr
Lewis: Gan
fy mod i’n un a oedd yn ymwneud â’r adroddiad
hwnnw, well imi beidio—. Mae
yna ddau ddewis yn cael eu cynnig yn fanna: un ydy’r hyn sy’n cael ei alw’n awdurdodaeth
ar wahân, ond sydd, a dweud y gwir, yn nes at yr hyn yr oeddwn
i’n ei ddisgrifio; a’r llall oedd rhyw reol o gyfraith
a fydd yn penderfynu pryd mae cyfraith Cymru a phryd mae cyfraith
Lloegr yn weithredol. Mae’n well gen i’r model cyntaf,
oherwydd ei fod yn symlach.
|
Mr
Lewis: As I was involved
with that report, perhaps it’s best that I
don’t—. There are two options proposed there: one is
what is called a separate jurisdiction, but, to be honest, is
closer to what I’ve described; and the other is a rule of law
that would decide when Welsh law and when English law would be
operational. I prefer the first model, because it’s
simpler.
|
[136]
William
Powell: I’m
grateful. Thank you very much.
|
[137]
David
Melding: Carolyn, is there
an area—
|
[138]
Carolyn
Harris: Mine has been
covered.
|
[139]
David
Melding: You feel
it’s been covered, again. Okay. In that case, we’ve
touched on the issue of clarity and such issues, and probed them in
the evidence, but there is, perhaps, a question—. Oh, Craig,
was there—
|
[140]
Craig
Williams: I’d love to,
Chair.
|
[141]
David
Melding: Oh right. If there
is still something on the jurisdiction, sorry.
|
[142]
Craig
Williams: Very quickly.
I’ve asked both the Secretary of State, in terms of the Welsh
Affairs, and Sir Paul this morning, in terms of the Silk
commission, about this jurisdiction debate that seems to have
raised its head. Everyone in the housing sector says that there is
a distinct jurisdiction now emerging of law on housing in Wales.
I’ve been asking and I was wondering whether I could ask your
considered opinion on whether you’ve got any practical
examples of any cases in Wales where there has been a problem in
terms of the legislation coming out of the Assembly and the
difference between England and Wales.
|
[143]
Mr
Lewis: Mae
yna straeon, ond tystiolaeth anecdotaidd, am fargyfreithwyr yn dod
o Lundain i glywed achosion yng Nghymru nad oedd yn ymwybodol bod y
gyfraith yn wahanol, er enghraifft, mewn achosion yn ymwneud â
iawndal am ddamweiniau ac yn hawlio tâl presgripsiwn yn
ôl fel rhan o’r iawndal.
|
Mr
Lewis: There are stories,
but anecdotal evidence, of barristers coming from London to hear
cases in Wales who weren’t aware that the law here was
different, for example, in cases related to accident compensation
and they were claiming prescription costs back as part of that
compensation claim.
|
[144]
Ond,
i fynd yn fwy eang, mae yna achosion wedi eu clywed sydd yn delio
â chyfraith benodol Gymreig. Er enghraifft, roedd achos yn
ddiweddar yn ymwneud â chludo plant i ysgol Babyddol yn
Abertawe a oedd, ymysg pethau eraill, yn gofyn dehongliad o adran
10 Mesur Teithio gan Ddysgwyr (Cymru) 2008 y Cynulliad
Cenedlaethol. Felly, mae cwestiynau o gyfraith Gymreig, felly, yn
codi’n aml. Wrth
gwrs, rydych chi’n sôn am y gyfraith yn ymwneud â
thai, wel, os bydd y ddeddfwriaeth newydd sy’n mynd
drwy’r Cynulliad ar hyn o bryd yn dod i rym, fe fydd yna
wahaniaethau mawr mewn cyfraith landlord a thenant
a
fydd yn golygu’r angen am weithdrefnau gwahanol o fewn
llysoedd yng Nghymru, ymysg pethau eraill.
|
But, to take this
more broadly, some cases have been heard that deal with
specifically Welsh law. For example, there was a case recently
related to taking children to a Catholic school in Swansea, which,
among other things, required an interpretation of section 10 of the
Learner Travel (Wales) Measure 2008, drawn up by the Assembly. So,
questions of Welsh law do come up regularly. Of course, you talk of
housing legislation, well, if the new legislation currently going
through the Assembly does come into force, then there will be major
differences in landlord and tenant law that will require different
procedures within courts in Wales, among other things.
|
[145]
Craig
Williams: But apart from
that anecdotal evidence, there isn’t that body out there at
the moment, or there isn’t anything either of you could point
to, saying, ‘Look, there is a crying out for this to be
changed’.
|
[146]
Mr
Lewis: Reit, ocê. Mae’r galw am newid i gael tiriogaeth
Gymreig a thiriogaeth Seisnig yn deillio o’r cymhlethdod
sy’n ymwneud â’r Bil drafft yma. Cwestiwn pellach,
rwy’n credu, yw: a oes angen y cyfarpar—y
superstructure—ar
gyfer system gyfiawnder Cymreig? Mae’n gwestiwn arall. Y cwbl rwy’n ei ddweud ydy
nad oes raid cael hynny er mwyn trwsio’r Bil yma. Mae’r
cwestiwn arall yna’n un y gallwn sôn yn hir iawn amdano,
ac mae yna enghreifftiau.
|
Mr
Lewis: Right, okay. The
demand for change to have a Welsh territory and an English
territory emerges from the complexities emerging from this draft
Wales Bill. I think it’s a further question as to whether the
superstructure is required for a Welsh justice system. That’s
a separate question. All I’m saying is that you don’t
have to have that in order to put this Bill right. That other
question is one that I could discuss at very great length, and
there are examples.
|
14:30
|
[147]
Mae’n bwysig bod cyfreithwyr a barnwyr yn gwybod y
gyfraith, ac felly byddai rhywun yn cymryd bod angen iddynt gael eu
hyfforddi am gyfraith Cymru. Nid yw hynny o anghenraid yn golygu
bod yn rhaid i chi gael proffesiynau ar wahân.
|
It is important
that lawyers and judges do know the law, and therefore one would
assume that they need training on Welsh law. That doesn’t
necessarily mean that you have to have separate
professions.
|
[148]
Craig
Williams: I think we could
talk about it for a while, but I don’t think the Chair would
let me—or Chairs, sorry.
|
[149]
David
Melding: Indeed.
|
[150]
Professor
Watkin: Could I just add
one point of information to that question? That is, the suggestion
behind the question would appear to be that, if there are no
problems currently arising, nothing needs to be done about it. But
that could just be putting off the day until problems begin to
arise, and then it’s too late. The point is there has been a
constitutional change, and the manner in which justice is
administered needs to reflect it. We don’t wait for things to
go wrong. The administration of justice needs to keep pace with the
way in which legislation is being produced for England and Wales.
That’s why I think the restrictions with regard to private
and criminal law are counterproductive in that regard. They send
out the signal that you assume that the law of England and Wales is
the same. That’s the signal that’s being sent out: it
will only be different where it’s necessary in relation to
private law and in relation to criminal law. That, I think, is the
wrong signal. The professions need to be told, and students need to
be told, that the law of Wales is not now always the same as the
law of England, and they need to be aware of that, and the
structures need to reflect that.
|
[151]
David
Melding: We’ve opened
the floodgates now. Chris Davies, quickly.
|
[152]
Chris
Davies: Thank you, Chair.
It’s just a quickie—whether we’ll have a quick
answer I don’t know. Having sat and tried to digest the
majority of what has come out of two very clever legal brains from
a Welsh perspective, I certainly glean a great deal of disquiet
towards this Bill. Perhaps I’m wrong, but I don’t think
so, from your perspective. What would you suggest the Secretary of
State for Wales does with this Bill—with this draft Bill,
shall we say—before it becomes a Bill?
|
[153]
Professor
Watkin: What I would like
to be heard currently is not so much the voice of lawyers and those
who study constitutional matters and politics, but what actually
civic society thinks about the Bill—its clarity, its
coherence, its complexity. I attended a meeting last Friday of a
body that, on behalf of the churches in Wales, monitors legislation
in both Cardiff and Westminster in order to see how they are
affected by it, and to participate in consultation exercises. One
of the things that was said to me afterwards was that they were
terrified by the complexity of the Bill as they saw it, and they
were relieved to know that the complexity was one of the issues on
which they could comment. I think it’s the voice of those who
are going to be affected by it in that way, and those who’ll
be affected by the laws that will be made as a result of a complex
structure, that needs to be heard. The only thing that I think I
would ask the Secretary of State to do with the Bill at this point
is to listen to what is being said by civic society, listen to the
calls of the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee for a
principled approach, and realise the benefits that would come in
the long term, because I cannot see a settlement that is lacking in
clarity, lacking in coherence and complex possibly being
long-lasting or durable, and that must be the ultimate
aim.
|
[154]
David
Melding: Alun, that has
answered your question as well, so I’m afraid we’re
going to pass over that. As is very appropriate, I’m going to
give the final question to Dafydd Elis-Thomas, a former Presiding
Officer of this noble institution.
|
[155]
Yr
Arglwydd Elis-Thomas: Nid
wyf yn siŵr a yw hynny’n syniad da, Gadeirydd.
Rwy’n meddwl mai dyma’r pumed ymdrech yn ystod fy
ngyrfa gyhoeddus i gynhyrchu cyfansoddiad i Gymru.
Mae’n fy nharo i mai dyma’r ymdrech salaf hyd yn hyn.
Felly, mae yna rywbeth yn bod ar gyfundrefn nad yw’n gallu
darparu cyfansoddiad priodol sy’n adlewyrchu barn gyhoeddus,
yn enwedig pan fyddwn yn ystyried y traddodiad anrhydeddus yng
Nghymru o ddyddiau Richard Price, athronydd mawr cyfansoddiad yr
Oleuedigaeth, hyd at y cyfreithwyr dysgedig sydd o’n blaen ni
heddiw. Pe byddech yn ysgrifennu cyfansoddiad i Gymru o’r
newydd, ble fyddech chi’ch dau yn cychwyn?
|
Lord
Elis-Thomas: I’m not sure
whether that’s a good idea, Chair. I think that this is the
fifth attempt during my public career to create a constitution for
Wales, and it strikes me that this is the worst effort yet. So,
there is something wrong with a system that can’t provide an
appropriate constitution that reflects public opinion, especially
when we’re considering the excellent tradition in Wales from
the days of Richard Price, the great constitutional expert of the
enlightenment, up to the very learned lawyers that we have before
us. But if you were to write a new constitution for Wales, where
would you both start?
|
[156]
Mr
Lewis: Gofyn i chi, Dafydd, siŵr o fod.
|
Mr
Lewis: I would probably
ask you, Dafydd.
|
[157]
Yr
Athro Watkin: Nid
wyf yn gwybod os gallaf ateb y cwestiwn, ond rhoddaf sylw ar y
cwestiwn. Un peth sy’n fy nhrwblu i yw’r ffaith bod pob
Cynulliad ond un sydd wedi dod yn ôl i’r bae yma yng
Nghaerdydd ar ôl etholiad wedi dod yn ôl i setliad
newydd. Mae hynny’n golygu nad oes traddodiad ynglŷn
â defnyddio’r setliad yn datblygu yng Nghymru. Bob tro
mae Aelodau yn cyrraedd bae Caerdydd, maen nhw’n gorfod dysgu
setliad newydd—yn 1999, nid yn 2003, ond yn 2007, yn 2011, ac
efallai eto nawr yn y Cynulliad newydd. Tan fod yna ryw fath o
draddodiad yn datblygu, lle mae pobl yn gyfforddus yn
defnyddio’r pwerau ac nid yn dysgu sut i ddefnyddio’r
pwerau a’r cymhwysedd, ni fydd y Cynulliad yn ffynnu yn y
modd y mae angen iddo fe ffynnu ar gyfer pobl Cymru.
|
Professor
Watkin: I don’t know
if I can answer that question, but I will comment on the question.
One thing that troubles me is the fact that all Assemblies bar one
that have been returned to Cardiff bay after an election have come
back to a new settlement. That means that a tradition in terms of
using the settlement does not develop in Wales. Every time Members
reach Cardiff bay, they have to learn a new settlement—in
1999, not in 2003, but in 2007, in 2011, and perhaps once again in
the next Assembly. Until there is some sort of tradition
established, where people are comfortable using the powers, rather
than constantly learning how to use their powers and their
competence, the Assembly will not prosper in the way that it needs
to prosper for the benefit of the people of Wales.
|
[158]
Mr
Lewis: Rwy’n credu fy mod i’n gwybod lle buaswn i’n
cychwyn, ac os caf i fod yn gadarnhaol, mae’r Ysgrifennydd
Gwladol wedi cychwyn yn yr un man, sef
|
Mr
Lewis: I think that I
know where I would start, and if I can be positive, the Secretary
of State has started in the same place, namely
|
[159]
‘An Assembly
for Wales is recognised as a permanent part of the
United
Kingdom’s
constitutional arrangements.’
|
[160]
Rydym ni wedi bod yn pigo ar y mân feiau—wel, maen
nhw’n feiau eithaf mawr, ond ar y manylion—ond
mae’n bwysig nodi hefyd fod y datganiad yna o fewn Bil
seneddol Prydeinig yn beth gwerthfawr iawn.
|
We’ve been
looking at the small faults—well, some of them are quite
significant faults, but on the details—but it’s
important to note that having that statement within a British
parliamentary Bill is very valuable indeed.
|
[161]
Yr
Arglwydd Elis-Thomas: Ydy,
ac mae hynny’n cyfateb i’r datganiad yn yr Alban, felly
nid ni a wnaeth hynny.
|
Lord
Elis-Thomas: Yes, it is, and it
corresponds to the statement in Scotland, so that’s not
something that we’ve done.
|
[162]
Mr
Lewis: Na,
ond mae o yna.
|
Mr
Lewis: No, but it’s
there.
|
[163]
Yr
Arglwydd Elis-Thomas: Beth
sy’n boen i mi ydy, wedi’r datganiad cyfansoddiadol
cyffredinol yna, mae’r canlyniad yn fwy cyfyngedig na beth
sydd gennym ni heddiw. Mae hwn yn fater o ddicter moesol i mi,
mae’n rhaid i mi ddweud, achos roeddwn i wedi gweld hyn yn
dod, achos nid oes gwahaniaeth mewn egwyddor—fel rydym wedi
ei drafod o’r blaen, yn sicr—rhwng materion wedi cael
eu gosod i Gynulliad gydag eithriadau, a materion sydd wedi eu
neilltuo gyda mwy o eithriadau. Felly, ble mae’r eglurder
cyfansoddiadol yn y sefyllfa hon?
|
Lord
Elis-Thomas: What is of concern
to me is that, following that general constitutional statement, the
result is more restrictive than what we have at present. That is a
cause of great moral concern to me, and anger, I have to say,
because I saw this coming, because there is no difference in
principle—as we have discussed before,
certainly—between matters that have been conferred to the
Assembly with exceptions and matters that have been reserved with
more exceptions. Therefore, where is the constitutional clarity in
this situation?
|
[164]
Mr
Lewis: Cywir, ond mi fuasai model pwerau wedi eu cadw yn ôl da
yn well na’r hyn—
|
Mr
Lewis: You’re
absolutely right, but a good reserved-powers model would be better
than what—
|
[165]
Yr
Arglwydd Elis-Thomas: Megis Gogledd Iwerddon, er enghraifft.
|
Lord
Elis-Thomas: Such as Northern
Ireland, for example.
|
[166]
Mr
Lewis: Wel,
efallai. Buasai’n well na’r hyn sydd gennym ar hyn o
bryd.
|
Mr
Lewis: Well, maybe. It
would be an improvement on the situation we currently
have.
|
[167]
David Melding: With that
question, which leaves us still a lot of material to ponder,
I’d like to thank Professor Watkin and Emyr Lewis for their
evidence this afternoon, which has been very stimulating, and
I’m sure it will be a great assistance to both committees
when we come to formulate our reports. As well as the people of
Wales and civic bodies, we do hope the Secretary of State will pay
a great deal of attention to our respective reports on the draft
Wales Bill. Thank you both very much indeed.
|
14:38
|
Tystiolaeth mewn
Perthynas â’r Bil Cymru Drafft
Evidence in Relation to the Draft Wales Bill
|
[168]
David
Melding: I’ll ask our
next set of witnesses to join us: Professor Richard Wyn Jones and
Professor Roger Scully, both of the Wales Governance Centre and
other august institutions and universities. I can describe both
Richard and Roger as serial witnesses. [Laughter.] They have
done much over the years—unpaid—to help with our work.
So, we’re very, very grateful. I’m sure you heard the
earlier session. Obviously these proceedings are conducted
bilingually, and you’ll get a translation on channel 1. You
do not need to touch your microphones, they’ll be operated
automatically. I’m going to ask Gerald Jones to start this
session of questions.
|
[169]
Gerald
Jones: Thank you, Chair.
Good afternoon, gentlemen. A fairly straightforward question to
start. You’ll note I did say ‘fairly
straightforward’. The Secretary of State has described
wanting these proposals to provide a clear, robust and lasting
settlement for Wales; how much do you feel that these proposals
actually mirror that statement?
|
[170]
Yr
Athro Jones: Diolch am y croeso, Gadeirydd. Mae’n rhaid i mi ddweud
mai dyma’r tro cyntaf erioed i fi roi tystiolaeth gerbron
eich pwyllgor chi. Mae’r pwyllgor dethol yn San Steffan yn
llawer iawn mwy croesawgar ohonof i. [Chwerthin.]
|
Professor
Jones: Thank you for your
welcome, Chair. I have to say that this is the first time that I
have ever given evidence before your committee. The select
committee in Westminster is far more welcoming to me.
[Laughter.]
|
[171]
David Melding: It just feels as
if you’ve given a lot of evidence.
[Laughter.]
|
[172]
Yr
Athro Jones: O
ran ymateb i’ch cwestiwn chi, yr ateb byr ydy
‘Na’, ond rwy’n meddwl ei bod hi’n bwysig
deall pam nad ydy’r hyn sy’n cael ei argymell yn y Bil
drafft yn darparu'r math o setliad mae’r Ysgrifennydd Gwladol
a phob un ohonom ni yn ei ddeisyf. Ac yn syml iawn, rwy’n
meddwl bod y broses sydd wedi arwain at y Bil drafft wedi creu'r
amwysedd rydym ni rŵan yn delio efo fo. Roedd yna nifer o
gwestiynau y bore yma i arweinwyr y pleidiau ynglŷn
â’r broses Gŵyl Ddewi. Mae yna rywbeth pwysig iawn
i’w ddweud am y broses Gŵyl Ddewi, achos rwy’n
meddwl ei fod o’n ganolog i lle rydym ni
rŵan.
|
Professor
Jones: In terms of
responding to your question, the brief answer is ‘No’,
but I do think it’s important to understand why what is being
recommended in the draft Bill doesn’t provide the kind of
settlement that the Secretary of State and each and every one of us
aspires towards. And quite simply, I think the process that’s
led to the draft Bill has created the ambiguity that we’re
currently dealing with. There were a number of questions this
morning to the party leaders on the St David’s Day process.
There is something very important that I need to say about the St
David’s Day process, because I think it is at the heart of
where we currently are.
|
[173]
Yn
gyntaf, nid pwrpas a nod y broses oedd darparu sail gydlynol, eglur
i setliad datganoli Cymru; nod proses Gŵyl Ddewi oedd cael
rhyw fath o ddealltwriaeth rhwng y pleidiau. Felly, beth
ddigwyddodd oedd eistedd i lawr, edrych ar yr hyn a oedd yn cael ei
gynnig gan Silk a chan Smith—mae pobl yn anghofio bod yr hyn
a oedd yn cael ei argymell gan Gomisiwn Smith ar gyfer yr Alban yn
rhan o’r hyn a ystyriwyd gan y broses Gŵyl
Ddewi—ac wedyn roedd y pleidiau yn gallu dweud
‘Rwy’n cytuno neu’n anghytuno efo hynny’.
Nid oedd rhaid i’r pleidiau egluro pam roedden nhw yn cymryd
y safbwynt yna. Nid oedd rhaid i’r pleidiau egluro sut roedd
yr hyn roeddwn nhw’n ei awgrymu yn mynd i arwain at setliad a
oedd yn ymddangos yn barhaol, a oedd yn eglur, ac ati. Lowest
common denominator oedd hi. Consensws yn hytrach na rhywbeth
synhwyrol oedd nod y broses.
|
First of all, the
purpose and aim of the process was not to provide a cohesive, clear
devolution settlement for Wales; the aim of the process was to have
some sort of understanding between the political parties. What
happened was they sat down, they looked at what was proposed by
Silk and by Smith—people do tend to forget that what was
recommended by the Smith Commission for Scotland was also part of
the considerations of the St David’s Day process—and
then the parties could say ‘I agree or disagree with
that’. The parties didn’t have to explain why they took
those positions. They didn’t have to explain how what they
suggested was going to lead to a settlement that would appear to be
permanent and provided clarity, and so on. It was a lowest common
denominator approach. So, the aim of the process was consensus
rather than a sensible approach.
|
[174]
Yr
ail beth i’w ddweud ynglŷn â’r ddogfen
yma—dogfen ‘Powers for a
Purpose’—ydy, yn ychwanegol at y broses honno, fe
ychwanegwyd nifer o
atodlenni—‘annexes’—ac nid
yw’n eglur i mi o le daeth yr annexes. Ond, yn
annex B yn arbennig, mae llawer iawn, iawn o’r
trafferthion rydym ni yn delio efo nhw heddiw. Yn annex B
mae’n awgrymu y byddai’n rhaid cadw
nôl—
|
The second thing
that I should say about this document—‘Powers for a
Purpose’—is that, in addition to that process, a
number of annexes were added, and it isn’t clear to me
where those annexes came from. But, in annex B particularly,
many of the difficulties that we are dealing with today emerge. In
annex B, it suggests that one would have to—
|
‘The Areas Where Reservations Would Be Needed: An
Illustrative List...Civil Law and Procedure...Criminal Law and
Procedure...’
|
[175]
Nid
wyf yn gwybod pwy yn lle benderfynodd bod yr hyn a gytunwyd arno fo
rhwng y pleidiau yn golygu bod yn rhaid cadw nôl civil law
and procedure a criminal law and procedure.
Nid oedd trafodaeth rhwng y pleidiau. Nid oedd
trafodaeth ehangach, ond mae yna rywun wedi cymryd yn ganiataol bod
hynny yn dilyn, ond nid wyf yn derbyn y rhesymeg. Mae llawer iawn,
iawn o’r trafferthion rydym yn eu cael heddiw yn deillio,
rwy’n meddwl, o’r ddogfen gychwynnol yma nad oedd, i
ailadrodd, ynglŷn â darparu setliad clir a chadarnhaol
ond a oedd, a chwarae teg i’r Ysgrifennydd Gwladol am
drio—nid wyf yn ei feio am drio; yn wir, rwy’n meddwl
ei fod yn haeddu canmoliaeth am drio—roedd o’n trio
gwthio’r agenda yn ei blaen ar sail Silk a Smith, ond nid
oedd hynny’n sail ddigonol.
|
I don’t know
who, and in what place, decided that what was agreed upon by the
parties meant that you would have to reserve civil law and
procedure and criminal law and procedure. There was no discussion
between the parties. There was no broader discussion, but someone
has assumed that that follows naturally, but I don’t accept
the rationale. Many of the difficulties that we’re facing
today do emerge from this initial document, I believe, which, to
repeat, wasn’t about providing a clear and permanent
settlement, but was, and fair play to the Secretary of State for
trying—I don’t blame him for trying; I think he
deserves great praise for attempting to do this—he was trying
to push the agenda forward on the basis of Silk and Smith, but that
wasn’t an adequate foundation.
|
[176]
Professor
Scully: I don’t have
a great deal to add to that; I agree with pretty much everything my
colleague has said. One thing I would add is that, understandably,
since the publication of the draft Bill, discussion has very much
focused overwhelmingly on problems or potential problems that some
people perceive in the Bill. In the one area that’s actually
closest to my own particular area of expertise—matters of
elections—I think actually there is a rather more positive
story to tell. I believe the provisions regarding elections in the
draft Bill are appropriate, substantive and broadly
positive.
|
[177]
Gerald
Jones: Could I ask a
follow-up question? Do you believe the new arrangements will lead
to fewer Assembly Bills being referred to the Supreme
Court?
|
[178]
Yr
Athro Jones: Nac
ydw. Gadewch imi ddweud fel rhyw fath o ragarweiniad bod yna nifer
o dystion y bore yma wedi cyfeirio at y gwaith mae Canolfan
Llywodraethiant Cymru wedi bod yn ei wneud dros y misoedd diwethaf.
A gaf i jest ddweud fel pwynt cyffredinol wrth y pwyllgorau fod yr
amserlen sydd wedi cael ei gosod ar y broses yma yn ei gwneud
hi’n anodd iawn, iawn i gyrff cymdeithas sifig fel
prifysgolion ymateb yn synhwyrol i’r hyn sy’n
mynd ymlaen? Mae’r amserlenni mor heriol. Rydym yn
ceisio darparu adroddiad manwl ar y Bil drafft. Yn y bôn, mae
gennym fis i’w sgwennu o. Nid oes gennym ddim cyllideb, dim
staff. Mae’n anodd iawn, iawn i ymateb mor gyflym i
ddeddfwriaeth sydd—. Fel mae’r Arglwydd Brif Ustus wedi
dweud, hwn ydy’r setliad datganoli mwyaf cymhleth ohonyn nhw
i gyd, ac rydym ni’n delio â fo ar ras wyllt, ac mae
hynny’n gwneud pethau’n anodd iawn. Mae’n ddrwg
gen i am ddweud hynny, ond rwy’n meddwl ei bod
hi’n bwysig gwneud y pwynt
|
Professor
Jones: No. Let me say as
a word of preamble that many witnesses this morning have referred
to the work that the Wales Governance Centre has been doing over
the past few months. May I just say as a general point to the
committees that the timetable set out for this process does make it
extremely difficult for civic society organisations such as
universities to make a sensible response to what is going on? The
timetable is so challenging. We are trying to provide a detailed
report on the draft Bill, and essentially we have a month to draft
that. We don’t have a budget, we don’t have staff.
It’s very, very difficult to respond so swiftly to
legislation which—. As he Lord Chief Justice has said, this
is the most complex devolution settlement of them all, and we are
dealing with it in great haste, and that does make things very
difficult indeed. I apologise for making that point, but I think
that it’s important that I did so.
|
14:45
|
[179]
O
ran y Goruchaf Lys, rwy’n gweld dwy ardal lle mae yna
broblemau potensial sylweddol. Mae’r cyntaf yn ymwneud
â’r materion sydd wedi’u cadw’n
ôl—y rhestr hirfaith yna—ac, yn benodol, y geiriau
pwysig ‘relates to’. So, nid yn unig mae gennym ni 267,
rwy’n credu, o faterion wedi’u cadw’n ôl,
ond mae gennym ni y ‘relates to’ yma, sydd wedi cael ei
fewnforio o ddeddfwriaeth yr Alban ac sydd efallai’n gwneud
synnwyr yng nghyd-destun yr Alban, lle mae’r rhestr o bwerau
sydd wedi’u cadw’n ôl gymaint â hynny’n
llai. Ond, yng nghyd-destun 260—beth bynnag ydy o—o
feysydd, mae hynny’n agor y drws i bob math o heriadau a
allai’n hawdd ddiweddu yn y Goruchaf Lys.
|
In terms of the
Supreme Court, I see two areas where significant potential problems
could emerge. The first relates to reserved matters—that
lengthy list—and, specifically, the important words
‘relates to’. So, not only do we have 267 reservations,
I believe, but we have this ‘relates to’, which has
been imported from Scottish legislation and perhaps makes sense in
the Scottish context, where the list of reserved powers is so much
shorter. But, in the context of 260 or so areas, that opens the
door to all sorts of challenges that could quite easily end up in
the Supreme Court.
|
[180]
Yr
ail ardal o anawsterau ydy’r ardal sydd ar hyn o bryd yn cael
ei hadnabod o dan faner ‘prawf
angen’—necessity test. Rŵan, y broblem
sylfaenol yn fanna ydy, wrth gwrs, y ffaith bod penderfyniad wedi
cael ei wneud yn atodlen B i’r Papur Gwyn sy’n dweud
bod yn rhaid cadw’n ôl i Lundain gyfraith droseddol a
chyfraith breifat. Yn sgil hynny, mae ymdrech i greu rhyw le bach
i’r Cynulliad allu gwneud yr hyn y mae deddfwrfa yn ei wneud,
sef deddfu. Mae’r gofod cyfyngedig iawn yna, sy’n cael
ei blismona mewn gwahanol ffyrdd, rwy’n meddwl, yn mynd i
arwain yn amlwg iawn at achosion yn y Goruchaf Lys. Felly, mae yna
ddwy ardal sylweddol iawn yn fan hyn, rwy’n meddwl,
sy’n gallu arwain at sialens.
|
The second area
where difficulties emerge is this area that at present is known as
the necessity test. Now, the fundamental problem there, of course,
is that a decision was taken in annex B of the White Paper that
states that criminal and private law must be reserved to London. In
light of that, there is an attempt to create a small space for the
Assembly to do what a legislature does, which is to create
legislation. That very limited or restricted space, which is
policed in different ways, I think, will lead quite clearly to
cases in the Supreme Court. So, there are two very significant
areas here, I think, which could lead to challenge.
|
[181]
David Melding: Liz
Saville Roberts.
|
[182]
Liz
Saville Roberts: Diolch yn fawr. Rwy’n cofio gofyn i’r Ysgrifennydd
Gwladol am y rôl ymgynghori gyda’r gymdeithas ddinesig y
tro cyntaf y gwelon ni o ar ôl cyhoeddi y Ddeddf,lle Roberts.gain edrych etor that heading ssity
tests--
[182]h t the reserved areas, i and what my view is
on that. rydym we ddrafft. Fe ddywedodd e wrthyf i yr adeg hynny fod yna
ymgynghori trwyadl iawn wedi bod trwy Gomisiwn Silk. Ond mae amser
wedi mynd heibio ers hynny. Mae refferendwm wedi digwydd yn yr
Alban; mae pethau’n newid ynghylch EVEL yn San Steffan, ac mi
rydych chi newydd sôn eich hun am rôl y gymdeithas
ddinesig. O ran lle rydym ni rŵan, beth ddylem ni ei wneud
felly?
|
Liz Saville
Roberts: Thank you very
much. I remember asking the Secretary of State about the
consultative role with civic society the first time that we saw him
after publishing the draft Bill. He told me at that time that there
had been very thorough consultation through the Silk Commission.
But time has passed since then. A referendum has happened in
Scotland; things have changed in relation to EVEL in Westminster,
and you’ve just spoken yourself about the role of civic
society. In terms of where we are now, what should we do
therefore?
|
[183]
Yr
Athro Jones: O
ran yr holl beth? Wel, mae pwynt ynglŷn â phroses. Os
ydym ni’n dymuno bod y drafodaeth hwn yn symud y tu hwnt i
fod yn ddadl rhwng llywodraethau, mae’n rhaid oedi’r
broses, achos, mewn cyd-destun lle mae gennym ni rywbeth sydd mor
astrus o gymhleth ac mae’r amserlen mor fyr, dim ond
llywodraethau sy’n gallu bod yn rhan o’r drafodaeth
honno. Felly, i roi enghraifft benodol i chi—. Mae’n
debyg y gwnaiff rhywun ofyn i mi ar ryw bwynt ynglŷn
â’r 260, neu beth bynnag ydy o, o feysydd sydd wedi cael
eu cadw’n ôl, a beth yw fy marn i ynglŷn â
hynny. Wel, rydym ni’n trio ysgrifennu adroddiad ar y Bil
drafft ar hyn o bryd. Y broblem ydy, mewn mis, sef beth sydd gennym
ni yn y bôn, nid oes modd i unrhyw gorff, hyd yn oed gydag
arbenigwyr cyfansoddiadol o faintioli’r bobl sydd yn rhan
o’r pwyllgor bach sydd yn ysgrifennu’r adroddiad, i
wneud y gwaith. Felly, fe allwn ni gymharu’r hyn sy’n
cael ei gadw’n ôl i Gymru o’i gymharu
â’r Alban a Gogledd Iwerddon, a dweud ‘Wel, nid
oes cynsail ar gyfer hyn; nid oes cynsail ar gyfer y llall’
ond allwn ni ddim mynd ymhellach na hynny yn y gofod o amser sydd
ar gael. Felly, mae’r amserlen yn ei gwneud hi’n anodd
iawn, iawn i bobl y tu allan i’r Llywodraethau. Mae’n
rhaid ei bod yn her eithriadol i chi, Mr Gadeiryddion, i ddelio
â rhywbeth mor gymhleth â hyn.
|
Professor
Jones: In terms of the
whole thing? Well, there is a point on process. If we want this
debate to move beyond an argument between governments, then we have
to delay the process, because, in a context where we have something
which is so incredibly complex and the timetable is so brief, it is
only governments that can participate in that discussion. So, to
give you a specific example—. I’m sure someone at some
point will ask me about the 260, or whatever it is, areas that are
reserved, and what my view is on that. Well, we are trying to write
a report on the draft Bill at present. The problem is that, in a
month, which is essentially what we have available to us, then it
isn’t possible for anybody, even with the constitutional
experts of the stature that we have supporting those people who are
part of the small committee writing the report, to do the work. So,
we can compare what’s being reserved for Wales as compared
with Scotland or Northern Ireland, and say ‘Well, there is no
precedent for this; there is no precedent for the other’ but
we can’t take it any further than that in the time that is
available. Therefore, the timetable makes it very, very difficult
for people outwith the Governments. I’m sure that it must be
a huge challenge for you, Mr Chairs, to deal with something as
complex as this.
|
[184]
O
ran sylwedd y peth, y tu hwnt i edrych yn fanwl ar y meysydd sydd
wedi’u cadw’n ôl, rwy’n meddwl mai’r
ddau beth pwysig wedyn yw edrych o ddifri ar y syniad o greu
awdurdodaeth gyfreithiol i Gymru, yn yr ystyr gyfyngedig rydym wedi
bod yn ei drafod dros yr wythnosau diwethaf. Rwy’n meddwl
byddai hynny o bosibl yn helpu gyda’r problemau ynglŷn
â phrawf angen—y pethau sy’n dod o dan y pennawd
yna. Ac rwy’n meddwl bod yn rhaid edrych eto yn fanwl iawn ar
y cwestiwn o gydsyniad gweinidogol. Roedd yna deimlad yn Swyddfa
Cymru, yn ôl yr hyn rwy’n ei ddeall, mai’r hyn
roedden nhw’n ei wneud oedd mewnforio’r drefn
sy’n bodoli yn yr Alban. Nid yw hynny’n wir, ac
rwy’n meddwl ei bod yn creu problemau gwleidyddol y gellid eu
hosgoi. Ond, mae angen mwy o amser i wneud hyn i gyd.
|
In terms of the
substance of the issue, beyond looking in detail at the reserved
areas, I think that the two important things then are to look in
earnest at the concept of creating a legal jurisdiction for Wales,
in the restricted meaning that we have been discussing over the
past few weeks. I think that would quite possibly assist with some
of the problems around the necessity tests—those things that
are included under that heading. And I think we must look again in
very great detail at the issue of Minister of the Crown consents.
There was a feeling in the Wales Office, as I understand it, that
what they were doing was importing the system that exists in
Scotland. That isn’t the case, and I do think that that
creates political problems that could be avoided. But, we need more
time to do all of this.
|
[185]
Liz
Saville Roberts: Ac i
ofyn cwestiwn cwbl bragmataidd, felly, rwy’n meddwl bod ein
hamserlen ni yn disgwyl bod yna ail ddrafft gyda ni erbyn diwedd y
mis yma?
|
Liz Saville
Roberts: And to ask an
entirely pragmatic question, therefore, I think that our timetable
expects a second draft by the end of this month?
|
[186]
David T.C. Davies: Nid
wyf yn siŵr, a bod yn onest. Mae’r dyddiadau yn symud
drwy’r amser, rwy’n credu.
|
David T.C.
Davies: I’m not
sure, to be honest. The dates are moving all the time, I
believe.
|
[187]
Craig
Williams: But, of course,
Chair, there would be a Committee Stage—you could feed into
that.
|
[188]
David T.C.
Davies: I suppose there
would.
|
[189]
Craig
Williams: So, it’s not
just a month. There’s a Committee Stage also.
|
[190]
Liz
Saville Roberts: Lle
rwy’n trïo mynd efo hyn ydy: faint o amser a ddylai fod
gennych chi, a gennym ni?
|
Liz Saville
Roberts: Where I’m
trying to go with this is: how much time should there be for you,
and for us?
|
[191]
Yr
Athro Jones: Rwy’n cymryd, efallai, mai’r hyn yr oedd fy
nghyfaill, Craig Williams, yn ei awgrymu oedd bod yna gyfleon yn
dod yn nes ymlaen yn y broses. Mae nifer o bobl wedi gwaredu y bore
yma—rwy’n credu mai Byron Davies oedd yn gwaredu bod
yna ddwy Lywodraeth yn mynd ben-ben â’i gilydd. Rhan
o’r ffordd o osgoi hynny ydy cael trafodaeth ehangach,
yndê, ac mae’n mynd i fod yn anodd iawn i gael y
drafodaeth ehangach yma ar amserlen mor gyfyngedig? Ac rwy’n
derbyn, wrth gwrs, fod yna fodd diwygio wrth i chi fynd
drwy’r broses yn Nhŷ’r Arglwyddi, ac ati, ac ati.
Ond, rwy’n meddwl bod cwestiynau mor sylfaenol ynglŷn
â’r bensaerniaeth.
|
Professor
Jones: I assume that what
my colleague, Craig Williams, was referring to was that there will
be opportunities later in the process. Many people have regretted
this morning—I think it was Byron Davies who was regretting
the two Governments going head-to-head on this issue. Part of the
way of avoiding that is to have a wider discussion, isn’t it,
and it’s going to be very difficult to have that discussion
given such a tight timescale? And I do accept, of course that there
are opportunities to amend, as you go through the process in the
House of Lords, and so on and so forth. But I do think that there
are such fundamental questions regarding the
architecture.
|
[192]
Un
arwydd o’r brys—sori, mae hwn yn obsesiwn
personol—ond un arwydd o’r brys ydy’r ffaith bod
cymaint o’r Bil drafft yn diwygio deddfwriaeth flaenorol ac
nad oes yna ddim consolidation. Felly, i ddarllen hwn,
mae’n rhaid i chi gael copi o Ddeddf 2006, a thywel efo
dŵr oer wedi ei lapio o gwmpas eich pen, a chymharu’r
ddwy ddeddfwriaeth. Fel cyfansoddiad Cymru, nid yw hwn yn hylaw,
ddywedwn ni.
|
One sign of the
haste—sorry, this is a personal obsession of mine—but
one sign of the haste is the fact that so much of the draft Bill
amends previous legislation and that there is no consolidation. So,
to read this, you have to have a copy of the 2006 Act, and a towel
doused in cold water wrapped around your head, and you have to
compare the two pieces of legislation. As a constitution for Wales,
this isn’t user friendly, shall we say.
|
[193]
David
Melding: Carolyn.
|
[194]
Carolyn
Harris: Thank you, Chair.
Richard, from what you’ve said, and from my perception of
things so far, I would argue that the Bill has been rushed, the
scrutiny has been rushed, and the end result is going to be rushed.
Is there an argument for pulling the reins, as it were, and seeking
to get longer time? Because, with the Bill as it stands, is it
really doing the best, and delivering the best, for
Wales?
|
[195]
Yr
Athro Jones: I
gael bod yn gadarnhaol iawn ynglŷn â’r cyd-destun,
fe ddeilliodd proses Gŵyl Ddewi o ddatganiad gan y Prif
Weinidog, David Cameron, a oedd yn dweud, ‘Edrychwch, rydym
wedi cael refferendwm yr Alban, ac rydym ni rŵan eisiau
darparu setliad mwy synhwyrol i Brydain gyfan.’ Ac mae
hynny’n cynnwys English votes for English laws, ac
rydw i, efallai, mewn lleiafrif o un o gwmpas y bwrdd yma yn credu
bod hynny’n syniad da—[Chwerthin.] Ocê,
lleiafrif bach o gwmpas y bwrdd yma. Ond, roedd bwriad gan David
Cameron i ddweud, ‘Edrychwch ar gyfansoddiad Prydain, a beth
am gael rhywbeth sy’n fwy sefydlog?’. Dyna’n
amlwg y mae Llywodraeth Cymru ei eisiau, a dyna, rwy’n credu,
mae’r pleidiau yn y Cynulliad i gyd yn dymuno ei
weld.
|
Professor
Jones: To be very
positive about the context here, the St David’s Day process
emerged from a statement made by the Prime Minister, David Cameron,
and said, ‘Look, we’ve had the Scottish referendum, and
we now want to provide a more sensible settlement for the whole of
Britain.’ And that includes English votes for English laws,
and I am, perhaps, in a minority of one around this table in
believing that that’s a good idea—[Laughter.]
Okay, a small minority around this table. But, it was David
Cameron’s intention to say, ‘Look at the constitution
of Britain, and let’s have something that’s more
stable’. That’s clearly what the Welsh Government
wants, and I think that that’s what the parties in the
Assembly all want to see.
|
[196]
Felly, mae llawer iawn o bobl eisiau mynd i’r un
cyfeiriad yn y fan hyn, a, beth bynnag yw diffygion proses
Gŵyl Ddewi, o leiaf roedd y pleidiau i gyd yn fodlon bod yn
rhan o’r drafodaeth. Ac mae cydweithwyr i mi yn yr Alban yn
synnu’n barhaol bod y pedair plaid yng Nghymru yn gallu
eistedd i lawr a thrafod yn waraidd efo’i gilydd, a chytuno.
Felly, mae hynny’n gadarnhaol hefyd.
|
So, very many
people want to travel in the same direction here, and, whatever the
deficiencies of the St David’s Day process, at least all of
the parties were willing to be part of that discussion. And
colleagues of mine in Scotland are continually shocked that the
four parties in Wales can actually sit down and have sensible
discussions, and come to agreement. So, that is positive
too.
|
[197]
Y
broblem ydy—a mynd yn ôl at broses Gŵyl
Ddewi—yr hyn a gafwyd drwy broses Gŵyl Ddewi oedd man
cychwyn. Roedd angen wedyn edrych ar yr hyn a gytunwyd, i edrych a
oedd hynny’n synhwyrol, a oedd hynny’n sail ddigonol i
symud ymlaen. Ni chafwyd y broses yna. Yr hyn a wnaethpwyd oedd
neidio’n syth i mewn i ddrafftio, ac mae’r problemau yn
y Papur Gwyn i gyd jest wedi cael eu trosglwyddo i mewn i’r
Bil drafft.
|
The problem
is—going back to the St David’s Day process—that
what emerged from the St David’s Day process was a starting
point. There was a need then to look at what was agreed, to see
whether that was sensible, whether that was a sufficient basis to
move forward. That process didn’t take place. What happened
was they jumped straight into drafting, and the problems in the
White Paper have simply been transposed into the draft
Bill.
|
[198]
Felly, rwy’n meddwl y byddai oedi yn synhwyrol, ond
oedi, a hefyd ystyried. Nid oes pwynt oedi er mwyn oedi. Mae oedi
yn gorfod arwain at ystyriaeth—rwy’n
gobeithio—gydweithredol, ryng-bleidiol.
|
Therefore, I do
think that a delay would be sensible, but we also need to consider.
There is no point delaying just for the sake of it. Delaying
matters must lead to consideration—I hope—on a
collaborative, cross-party basis.
|
[199]
David
Melding: Right, okay. I
think we’ve had a truly amazing, awesome view of the horizon
in its totality. We do need, however, to get to some specifics, so,
Mark Williams.
|
[200]
Mark
Williams: I enjoyed your
interpretation of the St David’s Day process. Having been one
of the people privy to those discussions, I would say that you were
spot on. Your analysis was very accurate indeed. You touched on
this earlier on, but I want to return to the test of competence and
the issue of the civil and criminal law. You’ve sat through
the evidence this morning and, as a group of academics,
you’ve done a strong body of work on the issues of those new
tests and the constraints. How restrictive are they in terms of the
scope of a proposed new devolution settlement and how practically
will they impact on the Assembly’s legislative competence,
and, I was going to say, if so, I would suggest it would be more a
case of how they will restrict the Assembly’s
work?
|
[201]
Yr
Athro Jones: Gan
ein bod ni’n dau yn dilyn yr Athro Thomas Watkin ac Emyr
Lewis, rwy’n meddwl fy mod yn hyderus iawn yn eich cyfeirio
yn ôl at eu sylwadau doeth nhw ynglŷn â’r
pwynt. Yr hyn y byddwn ni eisiau tynnu sylw ato ydy pam mae’r
prawf angen yno yn y lle cyntaf, achos, o fy narlleniad i o’r
prawf angen, fel roeddwn yn ceisio egluro yn f’ateb
blaenorol, mae’n deillio o’r penderfyniad yna fod
cynnal awdurdodaeth gyfreithiol unedol i Loegr a Chymru yn golygu
cadw yn ôl i San Steffan gyfraith droseddol a chyfraith
breifat. Mae yna rywun yn rhywle wedi penderfynu mai dyna
sy’n dilyn o’r awydd i gynnal un awdurdodaeth. Nid oedd
dim trafodaeth o gwbl o hynny. Unwaith rydych wedi gwneud y
penderfyniad eich bod yn cadw hyn yn ôl, gan na allwch chi
gael deddfwrfa sydd ddim yn creu deddfau ar droseddau a chyfraith
sifil, mae’n rhaid ceisio creu gofod i’r Cynulliad
Cenedlaethol allu gweithredu. Yr ymdrech i gyfyngu ar faint y gofod
yna sydd wrth wraidd yr holl ddadleuon yma ynglŷn
â’r prawf angen.
|
Professor
Jones: As we both are
following Professor Thomas Watkin and Emyr Lewis, I think I’m
very confident in referring you back to their very wise comments on
this point. What I would want to draw your attention to is why this
necessity test is there in the first place, because, from my
reading of the necessity test, as I tried to explain in my previous
response, it stems from that decision that maintaining a united
legal jurisdiction for England and Wales means reserving to
Westminster criminal and private law. Someone, somewhere, has
decided that that is what stems from the desire to maintain a
single jurisdiction. There was no discussion at all on that. Once
you’ve made the decision that you’re reserving this, as
you can’t have a legislature that doesn’t make laws
relating to crime and civil law, then a space has to be created for
the National Assembly to be able to operate. It’s that effort
to restrict the extent of that space that is at the root of all of
these discussions on the necessity test.
|
[202]
Suzy
Davies: On that last
point, when we talk about private law, I still think there’s
a fundamental problem in the definition of what private law is, and
criminal law for that matter. I’d be surprised if anyone
around this table would be comfortable with Wales interfering with
concepts of mens rea and laws of evidence, for example, but less
worried about whether we create new offences or not. So, is there a
central problem in calling the thing ‘criminal law’ or
‘private law’ in the first place and that that in
itself is creating a problem rather than solving it?
|
[203]
Yr
Athro Jones: Rwy’n cytuno. Mae yna broblem ddiffiniadol fawr. Mae
tystiolaeth ardderchog yr Athro Thomas Watkin sydd wedi’i
chyflwyno i chi yn nodi’r broblem ynglŷn â diffinio
cyfraith breifat, ac, yn yr adroddiad ddaru i ni ei ysgrifennu ar y
Papur Gwyn, un o’r pwyntiau roeddem ni’n ei wneud yn y
fan yna oedd bod y penderfyniad yna i geisio cadw’r pethau
yma yn ôl i San Steffan yn creu problemau sylfaenol, yn
gysyniadol ac yn ymarferol.
|
Professor Jones: I agree there is a
problem in terms of the definitions. The excellent evidence from
Professor Thomas Watkin that has been submitted to you notes the
problem with defining private law, and, in the report that we wrote
on the White Paper, one of the points that we made there was that
that decision to try to reserve these things to Westminster does
create fundamental problems, conceptually and
practically.
|
[204]
David
Melding: I’d like to
ask our co-Chair just to test out this issue, or the consequences
of it, of Crown conset.
|
[205]
David T.C.
Davies: I have a feeling I
know the answer to this, but what would your opinions be,
gentlemen, on the fact that the Bill will, apparently, remove the
ability of the Assembly to modify the functions of UK Ministers?
Does that make it more restrictive than was previously the
case?
|
[206]
Yr
Athro Jones: Mae’n rhaid i mi gyfaddef, a dyma gyfaddef gwendid,
mai’r rhan o’r Bill drafft sy’n ymwneud â
chydsyniad ydy’r rhan yr ydw i’n ei ffeindio yn fwyaf
cymhleth ac astrus. Roedd o’n gysur i mi y diwrnod o'r blaen
fy mod i wedi siarad ag un o brif arbenigwyr cyfraith gyhoeddus yr
ynysoedd hyn ac roedd o’n cydnabod ei fod o ei hun yn cael
trafferth efo’r rhan yma o’r ddeddfwriaeth gan ei bod
mor gymhleth. Felly, nid wyf yn siŵr bod gennyf lawer iawn i
ychwanegu i’r hyn yr ydych chi wedi ei glywed eisoes
heddiw.
|
Professor Jones: I have to confess,
and this is a confession of weakness, that the part of the draft
Bill relating to consent is the part that I find most complex and
abstruse. It was of some comfort to me the other day that, in
speaking to one of the main experts on public law in these isles,
he himself acknowledged that he had some difficulty with this part
of the legislation because it’s so complex. So, I am not sure
that I have a great deal to add to what you’ve already heard
today.
|
15:00
|
[207]
Yr
unig bwynt fyddwn i’n ei wneud, ac mae hwn yn bwynt
gwleidyddol yn hytrach na chyfreithiol, yw fy mod i’n credu
fod pawb yn teimlo y byddai symud i sefyllfa lle mae yna llai o
wrthdaro gwirion rhwng Bae Caerdydd a glannau’r Tafwys yn
fuddiol. Rwy’n credu bod pawb yn meddwl bod hynny’n
rhywbeth rŷm ni i gyd yn deisyf ei weld. Mae’r ffordd
mae’r cysyniadau yma wedi’u gosod allan—maen nhw
mor gynhwysfawr, mae’n anodd rhagweld eu bod nhw’n
arwain at ddim ac eithrio gwrthdaro. Byddwch chi, cystal â fi,
Mr Cyd-gadeirydd, yn cofio yn ôl i’r cyfnod LCOs
a’r drafodaeth ynglŷn â’r cyfnod yna cyn
gweithredu Deddf 2006 lle roedd pobl yn dweud, ‘Wel, bydd hwn
yn gweithio’n iawn achos bydd yna ewyllys da ar y ddwy ochr a
bydd yna ddim problem’, ac nid felly y bu. Felly, ar ôl
y profiad yna, rwy’n credu y dylem ni i gyd fod yn ofalus
iawn cyn dilyn cyngor sy’n dweud, ‘Wel, mae ewyllys da
yn bodoli a bydd hyn ddim yn broblem’.
|
The only point
that I would make, and this is a political point rather than a
legal point, is that I believe that everyone feels that moving to a
situation where there is less foolish conflict between Cardiff bay
and the banks of the Thames would be very beneficial. I think that
everybody would see that that’s something that we all aspire
to. But the way that these concepts have been set
out—they’re so comprehensive that it’s very
difficult to foresee that they lead to anything but conflict.
Co-chair, you will remember as well as I do the LCO period and the
discussion about that period before the implementation of the 2006
Act when people said, ‘Well, this will work very well because
there’ll be goodwill on both sides and there won’t be
any problem’, and that didn’t turn out to be the case.
So, after that experience, I think we should all be very careful
before pursuing advice that says ‘Goodwill exists and this
won’t be a problem’.
|
[208]
David T.C.
Davies: Rwy’n teimlo’n well eich bod chi’n
ffeindio’r holl broses yn anodd achos nid wyf i’n gallu
deall popeth chwaith—yn Gymraeg na Saesneg a bod yn onest.
Mae’n debyg i fi, pe na fuasai’r Gweinidogion ym
Mhrydain yn gallu newid rôl Gweinidogion yn y Cynulliad, nid
yw hi’n deg bod Gweinidogion yn y Cynulliad yn gallu newid
rôl Gweinidogion ym Mhrydain, neu faterion nad ydynt yn
devolved. Efallai ei bod hi’n bosibl dweud bod y Bil
yn gwneud pethau yn fwy teg ar bob ochr—a ydych chi’n
meddwl hynny?
|
David T.C.
Davies: I do feel better
that you are finding this whole process very difficult because I
can’t understand it all either—in English or in Welsh
if truth be told. But it appears to me that if Ministers of the
Crown can’t change roles of Ministers in the Assembly, then
it doesn’t seem fair that Assembly Ministers can change the
roles of UK Government Ministers, or deal with non-devolved issues.
So, it may be possible to say that the Bill makes things fairer on
all sides—would you agree with that?
|
[209]
Yr
Athro Jones: Rwyf
wedi clywed y pwynt yn cael ei wneud ac, yn wir, mae’r
Ysgrifennydd Gwladol wedi gwneud y pwynt wrthyf i. Yr hyn fuaswn
i’n ei ddweud mewn ymateb ydy nad ydych chi’n cymharu
tebyg at ei debyg. Mae Whitehall gymaint â hynny yn fwy
pwerus—felly, rwy’n meddwl, efallai yn ymddangosiadol,
ei fod e’n creu tegwch, ond nid wyf yn siŵr am
hynny.
|
Professor
Jones: I’ve heard
that point being made and, indeed, the Secretary of State has made
that point to me. What I would say in response is that you’re
not comparing like with like. Whitehall is so much more
powerful—so, I think it might appear to create fairness, but
I’m not sure about that.
|
[210]
A
gaf i jest wneud un pwynt sydd hefyd yn bwynt gwleidyddol?
Rwy’n meddwl y dylai fod o ddiddordeb mawr i aelodau
deddfwrfeydd fel y bobl sydd rownd y bwrdd yma. Yr hyn mae’r
busnes ynglŷn â chydsyniad yn ei wneud ydy rhoi’r
grym i’r weithrediaeth—i’r
executive—ac un o’r pethau sydd wedi nodweddu y
broses ddatganoli yng Nghymru, yn fy marn i, ydy ei bod wedi rhoi
gormod o rym i’r weithrediaeth ar draul y ddeddfwrfa.
Mae’r busnes yma ynglŷn â chydsyniad—grym i
Weinidogion ydy hwn, grym sydd ddim, wir yr, yn atebol. Rwy’n
gobeithio, fel aelodau o ddeddfwrfeydd, y byddwch chi’n nodi
mai’r ddeddfwrfa ddylai fod yn arwain, yn hytrach na’r
weithrediaeth.
|
May I make one
other point that’s also a political point? I do think it
might be of interest to the members of a legislature such as those
around this table. What the business in relation to consent does is
give power to the executive, and one of the things that has been
characteristic of the devolution process in Wales, in my opinion,
is that it’s placed too much power in the hands of the
executive at the expense of the legislature. This business about
consent—it’s power to Ministers, that’s what this
is, power that isn’t accountable. I do hope that, as members
of legislature, you will note that it’s the legislature that
should be leading on this rather than the
executive.
|
[211]
Rwy’n meddwl bod hon yn nodwedd rŷm ni wedi ei
gweld dro ar ôl tro yn hanes datganoli. Rŷm ni i gyd wedi
gwaredu at hynny yn y gorffennol, wel dyma ni enghraifft wych o
hynny ac rwy’n gobeithio y byddwch chi’n trio rhoi stop
arno. Dyma un o broblemau datganoli Cymreig yn cael ei
hailadrodd.
|
I do think that
this is a characteristic that we’ve seen time and time again
in the history of devolution. We’ve all been surprised by
this in the past, well this is an excellent example of this and I
hope that you will try to put a stop to it. This is one of the
problems of Welsh devolution being repeated.
|
[212]
David
Melding: Antoinette.
|
[213]
Antoinette
Sandbach: You spoke about
the conflict between the Welsh Assembly and the UK Government, in
effect. There was a recommendation in the Silk report of an
arbitration mechanism to be laid out by statutory instrument; a
code of practice, effectively. Do you think that would be a useful
addition to the Bill in order to take some of the heat out of it? I
note your recommendation to slow things down, but if we do slow
things down, then we’re taking it right into the heart of an
Assembly election where there may be much more polarised views in
the run up to May coming from the three parties. Really, from that
point of view, I’m concerned that slowing down the whole
process will actually lead to a worse outcome than sticking with
the current timetable, albeit that it causes problems for civil
society—and I’m sure that’s not the
intention.
|
[214]
Yr
Athro Jones: A
gaf i ddechrau efo’r ail bwynt? Rwy’n credu fy mod
i’n anghytuno efo chi ynglŷn â chanlyniadau arafu o
ran cyd-daro â’r etholiad. Yn ôl yr hyn rwy’n
ei ddeall, yr amserlen ar hyn o bryd—ac roedd Liz yn holi
David ynglŷn â hyn yn gynharach—. Yn ôl yr hyn
yr ydw i’n ei ddeall, bwriad y Llywodraeth Brydeinig ar hyn o bryd ydy
diwygio’r Ddeddf a’i gyhoeddi’n fuan iawn yn y
flwyddyn newydd a sicrhau ail ddarlleniad erbyn y Pasg. Mae hynny
yn union yng nghanol y cyfnod etholiadol. Felly, byddai oedi yn ei
fwrw y tu hwnt i’r etholiad yn syth, ac rwy’n credu
byddai hynny’n help o ran tynnu’r pwysau gwleidyddol
allan o’r broses.
|
Professor
Jones: May I start with
the second point in your question? I think that I would disagree
with you on the outcomes of slowing down this process and its
impact in terms of the election. As I understand the timetable at
present—and Liz asked David about this earlier—. As I
understand it, it’s the UK Government’s intention at
present to amend the legislation and to publish it very early in
the new year and to secure a second reading by Easter. That falls
directly within the election period. Therefore, any delay would put
it beyond the election immediately, and I think that would be of
assistance in terms of taking some of the political heat out of the
process.
|
[215]
O
ran y syniad yma o gael rhyw fath o gorff sydd yn cadw’r
ddysgl yn wastad, os liciwch chi, rhwng Caerdydd a Llundain, mi
fyddwn i, wrth gwrs, yn croesawu hynny. Mae nifer o
bethau—roedd Syr Paul Silk yn dweud bod hynny’n rhan
o’r adroddiad oedd, efallai, ddim wedi cael digon o sylw, ac
rwy’n meddwl bod hynny’n deg. Beth fyddwn i hefyd yn ei
ddweud yw nad yw hynny, ynddo’i hun, yn mynd i fod llawer
iawn o help os ydy pensaernïaeth sylfaenol y setliad yn
broblematig. Felly, wrth gwrs, mae angen gwneud yr hyn y mae Paul
Silk yn ei awgrymu—yr oedd comisiwn Silk yn ei
awgrymu—ond rwy’n credu bod yn rhaid hefyd edrych ar
bensaernïaeth sylfaenol y setliad, ac, am resymau rwyf wedi
ceisio eu hegluro, rwy’n meddwl bod yna broblemau sylfaenol
efo’r hyn sy’n cael ei gynnig hyd yma.
|
In terms of this
concept of having some sort of body that maintains a balance
between Cardiff and London, of course, I would welcome that. There
are a number of things—Sir Paul Silk stated that that was a
section of the report that hadn’t been adequately covered,
perhaps, and I think that’s a fair point. What I would also
say is that that, in and of itself, isn’t going to be of
great assistance if the fundamental architecture of the settlement
is problematic. So, of course, we need to do what Paul Silk has
suggested—and what the Silk commission suggested—but I
do think that we must also look at the fundamental architecture of
the settlement and, for reasons that I’ve tried to outline, I
do think that there are fundamental problems with what’s been
proposed to date.
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[216]
David
Melding: In the
introductions, Professor Scully did refer to the electoral
procedures that would come to the Assembly, and we’d now like
to look at some of these issues and related matters. I’ll ask
a former Member of this Assembly, Byron Davies, to put these
questions.
|
[217]
Byron
Davies: Thank you, Chair.
On to elections, then, I know, Professor Scully, you’ve, in a
recent blog, described the electoral provisions in the draft Bill
as significant—of course, this is a question to both of you.
So, perhaps I could ask you, then, about the provisions in the
draft Bill relating to new powers for the Assembly over electoral
arrangements in Wales, and the extent to which the powers would be,
perhaps, coherent and workable.
|
[218]
Professor
Scully: Okay, thanks.
It’s interesting; in the draft Bill, there are clearly some
things that are reserved, such as European elections, House of
Commons elections, also Police and Crime Commissioner
elections—a reservation that, I think, makes sense for
reasons that, maybe, we can come back to. There are then specific
powers given for National Assembly elections, and I talked in my
blog about some of the details there. Of course, there’s the
important silence in the Bill in terms of local elections. So,
they’re not listed as a reserved matter; that is in line with
the Silk report and the St David’s Day White Paper. They
would, therefore, presumably be transferred. Those are
significant.
|
[219]
My own
view is that, certainly, the detailed provisions on National
Assembly elections, including the super-majority requirement, are
sensible and coherent; they certainly allow for significant
flexibility. At the same time, they make it very clear that you
could not have a single party imposing, even if they had a narrow
majority in the Assembly, change on the electoral system for their
own benefit. The super-majority requirement is pretty stringent,
and we can get details of that if you want, but I think that
provides a reasonable balance. There is flexibility built into some
of the detailed provisions. At the same time, you need to clear a
fairly high threshold of consensus to actually achieve any change,
and, to me, that strikes, I think, a pretty appropriate
balance.
|
[220]
Byron
Davies: What about those
electoral laws that remain reserved? Any views on that?
|
[221]
Professor
Scully: I think that makes
eminent sense. House of Commons elections and European Parliament
elections are organised on a UK-wide basis. It would, therefore,
seem to make eminent sense for competence for them to stay at the
UK level. The one that is potentially, I suppose, to some people, a
bit more controversial is Police and Crime Commissioners, but I
think there is a political argument to be had about whether you
devolve policing to Wales or whether that’s kept as an
England and Wales matter. As the process has not led to agreement
on devolving policing it, therefore, clearly would not make
sense—. If Police and Crime Commissioners are part of the
model of how you supervise and control policing within England and
Wales, then it clearly would make no sense to devolve Police and
Crime Commissioner elections while the rest of policing has not
been devolved. Were you to, at some point, have a political
agreement that policing should be devolved within Wales, then that
reservation should be removed. But given where we are politically
on that general issue of devolving policing, I don’t think it
would make sense to do anything other than keep Police and Crime
Commissioner elections reserved.
|
[222]
Byron
Davies: Okay. From a
practical point of view, any view on how the Assembly and its
electoral arrangements could change if the proposed powers in the
draft Bill become law?
|
[223]
Professor
Scully: Well, the specific
provisions do create quite a lot of scope for flexibility in terms
of the fact that there are specific provisions for changing the
electoral system, the number of constituencies, regions, areas and
the number of members elected for each constituency. So, in
practice, almost everything is up for grabs. At the same time,
though, the super-majority requirement of two thirds of all
Assembly Members is likely to make it quite difficult to actually
change given that we are in a context where, politically, the
largest party, frankly, has a political interest in making the
system less proportional and the other parties currently
represented in the Assembly have a political interest in making the
system more proportional. Therefore, to surmount a two thirds of
all Assembly Members threshold will actually be quite a difficult
thing, politically, to do.
|
[224]
I am,
currently, with the Electoral Reform Society Cymru, working on
something which we hope to publish in the next few weeks. Would
there be possible ways of redesigning the electoral system that
might potentially be able to get a consensus? I think, in practice,
you’re going to have to have a system that is about as
proportional as the current system is, so that it doesn’t
manifestly disadvantage either those who currently benefit from
less proportionality or those who would benefit from more
proportionality. Within that I think there is still, possibly,
scope—and we will be publishing some
recommendations—there is possibly scope for changing the
electoral system, but it is going to be very difficult. I think we
should notice, with this two thirds super-majority requirement, as
two thirds of all Assembly Members—well, taking account of
the fact that some people are absent for a vote for one reason or
another—in practice, therefore, it’s more like a 70 per
cent or so majority requirement. At no point in the lifetime of the
Assembly thus far could the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats
combined have had the votes to change the electoral system on that
requirement. Also, the Labour Party and the Conservative Party
combined would not have had sufficient votes in the first and the
third Assemblies.
|
[225]
So,
this is a pretty high threshold that you’ll have to reach
agreement on. In practice, as long as they don’t slip below
20 Assembly Members, the Labour Party will always have a veto on
change, but also you would need to get at least one other
significant party agreeing on change. Throughout the lifetime of
the Assembly, except for the third Assembly, you would have needed
to get parties that got over 60 per cent of the constituency vote
behind change to actually have sufficient votes to push it through.
So, this is going to be quite a high threshold to agree.
Personally, I think that’s fine because I think electoral
systems are so fundamental. Parties have such an inherently strong
self-interest there. So, they should be protected against parties
being able to manipulate them to their own benefit. So, I think
that’s fine, but I think the committees should be aware of
just how high a threshold this is going to be and how difficult it
would be to get, given the political realities as well, consensus
around change.
|
[226]
Byron
Davies: You’ve made
elections sound very interesting.
|
[227]
Professor
Scully: It’s a
speciality of mine. [Laughter.]
|
[228]
Yr
Athro Jones: Tra’n cytuno â phopeth y mae fy nghyfaill diddorol
wedi ei ddweud, carwn ddweud yn ogystal mai un o’r pethau yr
ydym wedi bod yn ei wneud fel canolfan yw ceisio ystyried beth yw
goblygiadau maint y Cynulliad ar hyn o bryd, os liciwch chi, i
ansawdd democratiaeth yng Nghymru. Un o’r pethau sydd yn
drawiadol—ac rwy’n mynd yn ôl at bwynt a wnes i
ynglŷn â grym y weithrediaeth, yr
executive’—ar hyn o bryd mae gennym ryw 42 o
Aelodau mainc cefn yn y Cynulliad yn
dal Llywodraeth cymharol rymus, a dweud y gwir, yn atebol, ac, yn
ein barn ni, yn eu chael hi’n anodd dal y Llywodraeth yna yn
atebol.
|
Professor
Jones: While I agree with
everything that my interesting colleague has said, I would also
like to say that one of the things that we, as a centre, have been
doing is to try to consider what the implications of the size of
the Assembly, as it currently stands, if you like, are in terms of
the quality of democracy in Wales. One of the things that is very
striking—and I return to a point that I made on the power of
the executive—is that, at present, we have some 42 backbench
Members in the Assembly holding a relatively powerful Government to
account, and, in our view, have difficulty in holding that
Government to account.
|
15:15
|
[229]
Un
o’r pethau ddaru i ni ei wneud yn sgil hynny—ac
rwy’n gwybod nad yw hyn yn boblogaidd efo pawb, ac
rwy’n gweld Chris Davies yn eistedd yn
fanna—oedd
edrych ar beth ydy’r gymhareb ryngwladol o ran maint corff
tebyg i’r Cynulliad efo’r math o rymoedd sydd gan y
Cynulliad. O wneud hynny, beth ydych chi’n ffeindio ydy bod y
Cynulliad yn fychan iawn mewn termau cymharol.
|
One of the things
we did in light of that—and I know that this isn’t
popular with everyone, and I see Chris Davies sitting
there—was to look at the international ratios in terms of the
size of bodies similar to the Assembly, with powers similar to
those of the Assembly. In doing that, what you find is that the
Assembly is very small in comparative terms.
|
[230]
O
geisio edrych ar y dystiolaeth ryngwladol ar beth fyddai maint
corff tebyg i’r Cynulliad efo’r math o bwerau sydd gan
y Cynulliad a pha mor fawr y byddai fo, rydych chi’n edrych
ar tua 100 o Aelodau. Roedd hynny, wrth gwrs, yn symud y drafodaeth sydd wedi bod
ynglŷn â 60 versus 80; nid yw 80 wedi seilio, hyd
y gwelaf i, ar unrhyw sail dystiolaethol. Rŵan, rwy’n gwybod, wrth gwrs, bod hyn yn ddadleuol
tu hwnt, ond mae’n werth nodi mae’n debyg bod nifer yr
Aelodau Seneddol o Gymru yn mynd i leihau, ac mae’n debyg
bydd nifer y cynghorwyr o Gymru yn lleihau. Ar hyn o bryd, mae
gennym ni lot o Aelodau Seneddol y pen a lot o gynghorwyr y
pen—
|
From looking at
the international evidence on what the size of a body similar to
the Assembly with similar powers to those of the Assembly, would be
and how large it would be, you are looking at around 100 Members.
That, of course, moved the discussion, which has been about 60
versus 80; 80, as far as I can see, isn’t based on any
evidence base. Now, I know that this is very contentious, but it is
worth noting that the number of MPs from Wales is likely to reduce
and it’s likely that the number of councillors in Wales will
be reduced. At the moment, we have a number of MPs and councillors
per capita—
|
[231]
Byron
Davies: And
MPs.
|
[232]
Yr
Athro Jones: Ie—Aelodau Seneddol; rwy’n golygu Aelodau San
Steffan. Bydd y nifer yna’n lleihau, mae’n debyg, a
nifer y cynghorwyr yn lleihau. So, efallai bod yna le i gael
trafodaeth—nid wyf yn gallu rhagweld beth fydd canlyniad y
drafodaeth, ond efallai bod yna le i gael
trafodaeth—ynglŷn â maint y Cynulliad, oherwydd bod
hynny’n bwysig i ddal Llywodraeth yn atebol—maint y
Cynulliad, felly. Trafodaeth ynglŷn â maint y Cynulliad er mwyn
ystyried a ydyn ni’n dal Llywodraeth Cymru’n atebol yn
y ffordd y dylem ni fod yn ei wneud.
|
Professor
Jones: Yes—MPs; I
am talking about Members in Westminster. The numbers there are
likely to reduce and the number of councillors is likely to reduce.
So, there may be room for a debate—I don’t know what
the outcome of that debate would be, but perhaps there is scope to
have a debate—on the size of the Assembly, because
that’s important in terms of holding the Government to
account—the size of the Assembly, that is. A debate on the
size of the Assembly in order to consider whether we are holding
the Government to account in an appropriate manner.
|
[233]
Professor
Scully: If I could
just—
|
[234]
David
Melding: There is a danger
that we’ll end up talking not about the powers, but the
policies that are permitted under the powers. David.
|
[235]
David T.C. Davies: Yn
fyr iawn, pa wledydd yr ydych chi wedi eu hystyried?
|
David T.C.
Davies: Very briefly, what
countries have you looked at?
|
[236]
Yr
Athro Jones: Rwy’n hapus iawn i ddanfon copi o’r adroddiad
atoch chi, ond mae’n wledydd y Gymanwlad a gwledydd Ewrop,
felly dyna—. Ond rwy’n hapus iawn i ddanfon
copi.
|
Professor
Jones: I’m very
happy to send you a copy of that report, but it’s
Commonwealth nations and the nations of Europe, so, that’s.
But I’m more than happy to send you a copy.
|
[237]
Professor
Scully: If I could just
add to the comments of my colleague there two very short points,
firstly is that, given the relative weakness of the media
environment in Wales, which I won’t need to explain, I think,
to anyone in this room, frankly, effective scrutiny of the
Government isn’t likely to come from the media outside the
Assembly and the Welsh Government. If you’re going to get
really effective scrutiny of the Welsh Government, it’s
probably going to have to come, largely, from within the Chamber,
and I think that’s one of the arguments that, for me, most
underpins the broad arguments we’ve made in favour of
increasing the size of the Assembly.
|
[238]
I
think, also, if we’re looking at possible changes to the
electoral system, if there isn’t at least some flexibility in
the number of Members—. It’s going to be difficult
enough already to get some consensus on any changes to the
electoral system at any point. If there were absolutely no
flexibility as well to the total number of Assembly Members, I
think it would make it more or less impossible to square that
circle.
|
[239]
David
Melding: Before we move on,
can I—? This is a subject that’s left scars on Assembly
Members and this committee—the issue of disqualification.
It’s surprising that that’s not going to be devolved,
given, as I said, our particular unfortunate experiences. A report
of this committee clearly outlined the problems we have at the
moment where the issue isn’t devolved and we can’t get
on and really draft effective, clear law in this area. What’s
your view on disqualification?
|
[240]
Professor
Scully: That’s not
something I’ve written about, but it would seem to me, if
you’re going to devolve the electoral system and most other
matters of electoral arrangements, it would be simpler to devolve
that, as well, at the same time, probably subject to fairly similar
super majority requirements, in that you ought to acquire
substantial consensus before you actually change any provisions
there.
|
[241]
David
Melding: I’d like us
to look at this issue of Welsh jurisdiction. We’ve been told
that it doesn’t necessarily have to be separate; a
distinction that’s not always clear, I think, in
people’s minds—or my own, really. Craig Williams, did
you want to start on this?
|
[242]
Craig
Williams: I’m happy
to, David. We’ve spoken a lot about this today and a lot in
previous committees, and it’s been interesting to develop the
argument today about a distinct jurisdiction rather than separate.
Can I ask you more broadly about this, because, you know, a rose by
any other name—? Now that the Assembly is making these laws
and we’re starting to get a distinct jurisdiction, do you
think there’s a confidence issue in terms of Welsh civic
society in not saying, ‘We have a distinct jurisdiction and
this is an issue of training and everything else
now’?
|
[243]
Yr
Athro Jones: Diolch am y cwestiwn, a diolch am y cyfle i drafod y mater
yma. Rwy’n credu bod yr adroddiad mi ddaru inni gyhoeddi ar y
cyd efo constitution unit Coleg Prifysgol Llundain wedi bod
yn bwysig o ran cyflwyno’r syniad yma. Fel y bu i’r
Cadeirydd awgrymu, mae’r derminoleg efallai wedi gwneud hyn i
gyd yn fwy cymhleth nag sy’n rhaid iddo fod. Mae pobl wedi
cael yr argraff fod creu awdurdodaeth i Gymru yn golygu creu system
lysoedd cyfan gwbl wahanol, gosod y proffesiwn cyfreithiol ar
seiliau gwahanol, datganoli cyfiawnder, ac ati ac ati. Felly, mae
pobl wedi gweld hyn fel rhyw gam nid yn unig sylweddol yn
weinyddol, ond fel rhyw gam existential
mawr iawn. Mae’n bosib bod yna ddadleuon dros wneud y pethau
yna i gyd, ac mae hynny’n drafodaeth y fedrwch chi ei chael,
ond mae yna fodd i chi greu awdurdodaeth mewn ystyr llawer iawn yn
fwy cyfyngedig, a dyma beth rydym wedi ei galw’n awdurdodaeth
benodol, distinct jurisdiction.
|
Professor
Jones: Thank you for the
question, and thank you for the opportunity to discuss this matter.
I believe that the report that we published on a joint basis with
the constitution unit of University College London has been
important in putting forward this idea. As the Chair suggested, the
terminology has perhaps made all of this more complex than it needs
to be. People have got the impression that creating a jurisdiction
for Wales means creating an entirely different courts system,
placing the legal profession on a different basis, devolving
justice, and so on and so on. So, people have seen this as not only
a substantial administrative step, but as some sort of considerable
existential step. It’s possible that there are arguments for
doing all of those things, and that is a debate that you can have,
but it is possible for you to create a jurisdiction in a much more
restricted sense, and this is what we have called a distinct
jurisdiction.
|
[244]
Rwy’n credu bod Emyr Lewis wedi mynegi hyn yn dda iawn
yn y sesiwn blaenorol, lle’r oedd yn dweud bod hyn yn fater o
gydnabod fod cyfraith Cymru yn bodoli. Felly, mae ynglŷn ag
extent. Felly, rwy’n meddwl mai cydnabod—yn
hytrach na bod y lle yma’n pasio neu’n creu
deddfwriaeth England and Wales, sef y sefyllfa bresennol,
ein bod ni jest yn derbyn realiti, mewn ffordd, bod y lle
yma’n pasio deddfwriaeth Gymreig. Mantais fawr hynny ydy ei
fod yn delio â’r broblem rydym ni wedi ei chael yn
deillio o atodlen B ‘Powers for a Purpose’, sy’n
dweud ein bod ni’n cadw yn ôl i Lundain cyfraith
droseddol, cyfraith breifat, ac yn y blaen. Os ydych chi’n
creu awdurdodaeth benodol i Gymru yn yr ystyr mwy cyfyngedig yna,
wel mae llawer iawn o’r problemau yna yn diflannu. Felly, mi
allai hyn, i rai pobl, fod yn gam i’r cyfeiriad cywir o greu
awdurdodaeth yn gyfan gwbl ar wahân rhyw dro, neu mi allai fod
yn ddiwedd y daith. Rhywbeth weddol bragmatig ydy hyn i ddelio
â’r anawsterau sy’n codi, rwy’n meddwl,
o’r ffaith bod rhywun wedi diffinio goblygiadau’r hyn a
gytunwyd ym mhroses Gŵyl Ddewi fel rhywbeth sy’n golygu
trin gofod deddfu’r Cynulliad fel rhywbeth cyfyngedig dros
ben.
|
I believe that
Emyr Lewis expressed this very well in the previous session, where
he said that this is a matter of acknowledging that Welsh law does
exist. Therefore, it is about extent. So, I think that it’s
about acknowledging—rather than this place passing or
creating England-and-Wales law, which is the current situation,
that we accept the reality, in a way, that this place passes Welsh
legislation. The great advantage of that is that it deals with the
problem that we’ve had stemming from annex B of ‘Powers
for a Purpose’, which says that we reserve to London criminal
law, private law, and so on. If you create a distinct jurisdiction
for Wales in that more restricted sense, then many of those
problems disappear. So, this, for some people, could be a step in
the right direction of creating an entirely separate jurisdiction
at some point, or it could be the end of the journey. It’s
quite a pragmatic way of dealing with the difficulties that arise,
I believe, from the fact that someone has defined the implications
of what was agreed in the St David’s Day process as something
that means treating the Assembly’s legislative space as a
very restricted thing.
|
[245]
Craig
Williams: But coming back to
my key question about is this just Welsh civic life not having the
confidence to say, ‘Look, a rose by any other name; we have
our own Welsh jurisdiction on these laws. We are making laws, we
have made laws, they are being interpreted, they are being
implemented; it is already there’, why are we looking up at
Westminster and saying, ‘Please, guys, will you tell us we
have a Welsh jurisdiction’, when we’ve got
one?
|
[246]
Yr
Athro Jones: Mae’n ddrwg gen i, roeddwn yn araf yn deall y cwestiwn.
Ie, rwy’n cytuno, yn yr ystyr mai mater yw o’r
cyfansoddiad yn dal i fyny efo realiti deddfwriaethol. Rwy’n
deall y pwynt yna. Beth fuaswn yn dweud ydy, oherwydd nad ydyw wedi
cael ei gydnabod yn ffurfiol, beth rydych yn ei gael ydy’r
prawf angen a’r math yma o beth. Felly, ie, y realiti ydy bod
y lle yma’n creu deddfwriaeth Gymreig, ond oherwydd nad
yw’r cyfansoddiad yn cydnabod hynny, rydym rŵan yn
wynebu sefyllfa lle mae yna Fil drafft o’n blaenau ni
sy’n cynnig syniadau rwy’n meddwl sydd yn mynd i fod yn
gymhleth tu hwnt er mwyn cynnal yr ideoleg, am wn i, o England
and Wales.
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[247]
Professor
Jones: I’m sorry, I
was slow to understand the question. Yes, I agree, in the sense
that this is a matter of the constitution catching up with the
legislative reality. I understand that point. What I would say is
that, because this has not been acknowledged formally, what you get
is the necessity test and that sort of thing. So, yes, the reality
is that this place is creating Welsh law, but because the
constitution doesn’t acknowledge that, we now face a
situation where there is a draft Bill in front of us that offers
ideas that I think will be extremely complicated in order to
maintain the ideology, as far as I know, of England and
Wales.
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[248]
Craig
Williams: And you
don’t think that’s just a follow on from our glorious
unwritten constitution and the complex nature of all this, and that
this is just the Secretary of State setting out very pragmatic ways
to work this through?
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[249]
Yr
Athro Jones: Mae’n rhaid i mi ddweud fy mod i’n edmygydd mawr
o’r hyn mae’r Ysgrifennydd Gwladol wedi bod yn ceisio
ei wneud drwy’r broses yma, er fy mod i’n feirniadol o
le rydym wedi ei gyrraedd. Nid wyf yn gweld llaw’r
Ysgrifennydd Gwladol y tu ôl i’r prawf angen. Buaswn
i’n dychmygu mai’r Weinyddiaeth Gyfiawnder, efallai,
sydd wedi penderfynu mai dyma’r ffordd ymlaen, yn hytrach
na’r Ysgrifennydd Gwladol dros Gymru.
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Professor
Jones: I have to say that
I am a great admirer of what the Secretary of State has been trying
to do through this process, even though I am critical of where we
have reached. I don’t see the hand of the Secretary of State
behind the necessity test. I would imagine that it’s the
Ministry of Justice, perhaps, that’s decided on this way
forward, rather than the Secretary of State for Wales.
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[250]
David
Melding: Alun
Davies.
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[251]
Alun
Davies: Thank you very
much. I read the report on the distinct jurisdiction, and
I’ve listened to the debate and the discussion that
we’ve had, but is it not the case that the reason that
we’ve made such a mess of devolution in Wales over the last
20 years, and we’ve had a new Act of Parliament delivering a
durable, lasting settlement every four or five
years—
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[252]
Professor
Jones: Lasting for a
generation.
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[253]
Alun
Davies: A generation, yes.
It is because we’ve tried to steer our way through 1,000
sacred cows and ended up delivering nothing more than a fudge that
satisfies nobody and works only with the most extraordinary
complexity and 1,000 textbooks to teach people the simplicity of
making law and running a Government. Is it not time that we
actually took the opportunity here to take the Secretary of State
at his word and create some clarity, some simplicity and some
durability in this settlement, and, by doing so, we create a
jurisdiction that delivers law in Wales within the context of the
United Kingdom and we create a federal solution here that actually
creates the simplicity that we’re trying to achieve? Because
it appears to me that the paper—it’s very well written,
I enjoyed reading it, but it doesn’t deliver any of the
ambitions or the objectives of either the Secretary of State or any
one of the parties represented around the table here.
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[254]
Yr
Athro Jones: Mae
gen i gryn dipyn o gydymdeimlad efo hynny, Alun, ac nid ydym yn
ceisio awgrymu fod awdurdodaeth benodol yn ateb y problemau i gyd.
Fe wnes i ddweud bod yna dair set o broblemau efo’r Mesur
drafft. Un ydy yr ardaloedd sydd wedi eu cadw yn ôl, a
‘relates to’, sy’n eu hehangu nhw ymhellach. Yr
ail ydy’r canlyniadau sydd yn codi o gadw yn ôl i
Lundain gyfraith droseddol a phreifat, a'r trydydd ydy cydsyniad
gweinidogol. Dyna’r meysydd problematig. Rwy’n meddwl
byddai awdurdodaeth benodol yn eich helpu chi i ddelio
â’r ail. Ni fuasai yn delio â’r cyntaf. Mi
fyddai creu awdurdodaeth ar
wahân—separate—yn eich helpu chi
efo’r cyntaf, achos os ydych chi’n edrych ar y rhestr o
267 o feysydd wedi eu cadw yn ôl, mae lot ohonyn nhw yn
ymwneud â chyfiawnder. Ond, hyd y gwelaf i, nid oes yna awydd
trawsbleidiol i ddatganoli cyfiawnder, ac felly mae’r syniad
o greu awdurdodaeth ar wahân yn non-starter yn yr ystyr
yna. Ond mi fyddai awdurdodaeth ar wahân a datganoli
cyfiawnder yn lleihau yn sylweddol y nifer o feysydd sydd wedi eu
cadw yn ôl, ond nid wyf yn gweld unrhyw awydd trawsbleidiol i
wneud hynny. Beth rwy’n gobeithio ydy y bydd yr awydd
trawsbleidiol yna i edrych ar yr ail o’r cwestiynau yna, ac
rwyf yn meddwl y byddai awdurdodaeth benodol yn help sylweddol wrth
edrych ar hynny. Ond nid yw yn panacea—nid wyf yn
honni ei fod o—ond mae o’n helpu efo un broblem benodol
y gallai yna fod sail drawsbleidiol i symud ymlaen arni o
bosibl.
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Professor
Jones: I have some
sympathy with that, Alun, and we’re not seeking to suggest
that a distinct jurisdiction is a panacea. I did say that there
were three sets of problems with the draft Bill. One is the
reservations, plus the ‘relates to’, which expands them
further. The second is the outcomes of reserving criminal law and
private law to London, and the third is Minister of the Crown
consents. Those are the problematic areas. I think a distinct
jurisdiction would help you deal with the second. It wouldn’t
help with the first. The creation of a separate jurisdiction would
help you with that first problem, because if you look at that list
of 267 reservations, many of them relate to justice. But, as far as
I can see, there is no cross-party desire to devolve justice, and
therefore the concept of creating a separate jurisdiction is a
non-starter in that sense. But a separate jurisdiction along with
the devolution of justice would significantly reduce the number of
reservations, but I don’t see any cross-party desire to do
that. What I do hope is that the cross-party desire will be in
place to look at the second of those questions, and I do think that
a distinct jurisdiction would be of great assistance in looking at
that. But it’s not a panacea—I’m not claiming
that it is—but it does help with one specific problem where
there could be cross-party agreement to move forward.
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[255]
Alun
Davies: But that’s
the problem, isn’t it, because we’ve always worked on
the basis of what’s politically expedient today or tomorrow,
and not what is right and what is a point of principle that will
deliver the best governance for the people of Wales, and the best
governmental structure within the United Kingdom. It would appear
to me, having listened to a lot of these debates, that we are still
steering our way through this jungle rather than actually
establishing a structure of governance that will be durable for
this generation and the next generation, and will provide the
simplicity that we all say that we require. That does mean—I
accept what you say, by the way, but that does mean the political
parties actually looking hard at themselves and changing and
challenging themselves, rather than being pushed by the reality of
generations of fudges.
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[256]
David
Melding: I think
we’ve covered this rather a lot, and that view stands on the
record. I’ve got Byron Davies. Chris Davies, were you trying
to attract my eye? I’m losing count now of people.
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[257]
Chris
Davies: It was on a
previous point. I won’t go back to it now, Chair.
|
[258]
David
Melding: I beg your pardon.
I’ll go to Liz Saville Roberts first, then Byron and then
we’re going to have to close.
|
[259]
Liz
Saville Roberts: Diolch yn fawr iawn. Buaswn yn licio cymryd cam yn ôl a
pheidio rhuthro i’r sefyllfa lle rydym yn derbyn bod
cydsyniad gwleidyddol yn anochel i ni symud ymlaen, achos nid yw
hynny i’w weld yn creu cyfanwaith cydlynus i ni, ac
mae’n bwysig rŵan ein bod yn edrych ar beth yw’r
cam yn ôl.
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Liz Saville
Roberts: Thank you very
much. I would like to take a step back and not rush to a situation
where we accept that political consent is required for us to move
forward, because that doesn’t seem as if it creates a
co-ordinated picture, and it’s important that we do take that
step back.
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15:30
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[260]
Mi
oedd yn ddiddorol gennyf weld eich adroddiad chithau yn ôl ym
mis Medi ar y model o bwerau a gedwir nôl yn rhestru saith
cwestiwn fel dull o ddehongli a all rywbeth, neu a ddylai rywbeth,
gael ei ddatganoli neu ei gadw yn y canol. Nid wyf yn meddwl bod
neb ohonom wedi defnyddio’r saith cwestiwn hynny ynglŷn
â’r 200-plws o faterion sy’n cael eu rhestru yn y
Mesur yma. Nid wyf yn gwybod—a fuasech chi’n awgrymu
bod hwnnw’n ddull defnyddiol a niwtral, efallai, i edrych ar
y pethau sydd wedi cael eu rhestru yn y Ddeddf?
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It was interesting
to see your report in September on the reserved-powers model
listing seven questions as a method of interpreting whether
something could or should be devolved, or reserved at the centre. I
don’t think that any of us have used those seven questions or
asked them in relation to the 200-plus matters that are listed in
this Bill. I don’t know—would you suggest that that
would be a useful, neutral method, perhaps, to look at those things
that are listed in the Bill?
|
[261]
Yr
Athro Jones: Byddwn, ond mi fyddwn i hefyd yn rhybuddio nad yw
hwnnw’n broses syml. Mi ddaru, rwy’n credu, i’r
Athro Thomas Watkin wneud pwynt, wrth edrych ar y meysydd
wedi’u cadw nôl, fod angen siarad nid jest efo
arbenigwyr cyfansoddiadol fel fo, a phobl sy’n ymddiddori yng
ngwleidyddiaeth y cyfansoddiad fel fi, ond arbenigwyr polisi mewn
meysydd penodol, ac os oes yna 267 o feysydd, mae hynny’n
heriol dros ben. Mae eisiau ymarferiad fel yna, ond mae’n
mynd i fod yn amhosibl i’w wneud yn yr amser sydd ar
gael.
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Professor
Jones: Yes, but I would
also warn that that isn’t a simple process. I think Professor
Thomas Watkin made a point that, in looking at reservations,
there’s a need to speak to not just constitutional experts
such as him, or those who take an interest in the politics of the
constitution such as myself, but policy experts in certain areas,
and when there are 267 areas, that’s very challenging indeed.
You need an exercise of that sort, but it’s going to be
impossible to do it given the timescales available to
us.
|
[262]
David
Melding: Dafydd, I think
we’ve covered most issues on clarity and durability now, so,
as you can see, Haydn’s farewell symphony is going to start
if we’re not careful. [Laughter.] So, I will draw
these proceedings to a close with our most grateful thanks to the
witnesses who have illuminated these complex matters, and, I think,
set them in a wider political context, which is what we were hoping
to do to balance the earlier session, which really did go into some
of the legal questions in proper depth.
|
[263]
Can I
thank all Members this afternoon for your forbearance? I did call
everyone, I think, but not necessarily when you wanted to be
called. It is a bit of a challenge, chairing a joint committee, but
thank you very much for your co-operation. Can I also thank the
secretariats of both our committees, who’ve worked very hard
behind the scenes to ensure that today’s meeting was a
success? For those of us who are left, there is a joint photograph
before the Welsh Affairs Committee convenes again to scrutinise the
First Minister. So, we wish you will with that session, and we will
keep an eye on it. But, with that, thank you very much,
diolch yn fawr.
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Daeth y cyfarfod i ben am 15:32.
The meeting ended at 15:32.
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